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From 1985 to 1991, Syria experienced a severe economic crisis. In response, the 
regime of Hafiz al-Asad implemented economic reforms designed to move the Syrian 
economy toward free-market capitalism. As seen in authoritarian regimes around the 
world during the past thirty years, political liberalization often accompanies economic 
reform. Yet, scholars and policymakers have typically viewed Syrian economic reform 
as politically unimportant: mere tactical maneuvers that strengthened the Asad regime by 
restoring economic growth. This thesis reevaluates the political importance of the 
reforms from a political economy perspective. Two surprising conclusions are reached: 
(1) the political legacy of the economic reforms has so weakened the Asad regime that 
prospects for political stability within Syria are poor; and (2) transition to democracy, or 
political liberalization, is the probable outcome of the coming instability. The 
ramifications of these conclusions are twofold. First, they serve as a warning to U.S. 
policymakers, suggesting that regional stability will remain elusive until the root causes 
of regional economic underperformance are addressed. Additionally, by explaining the 
political outcome of the 1985 Syrian economic crisis with a political economy model, this 
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From 1985 to 1991, Syria experienced a severe economic crisis. In response, the 
regime of Hafiz al-Asad quickly implemented a program of "selective liberalization" 
designed to restore economic growth and strengthen the regime itself These reforms, not 
forced upon the Asad regime by external creditors, were haphazard efforts to address 
pressing economic problems. By 1991, the crisis was over, removing the immediate need 
for deeper economic reforms. The outcome of the crisis, particularly the survival of 
Asad, and the reluctance of his regime to fulfill its promises of further economic reforms, 
seemed to vindicate those scholars and policymakers that viewed the economic reforms 
as politically unimportant. This thesis reexamines the political importance of the 
reforms, and concludes that the economic reforms implemented in response to the 1985-
1991 economic crisis may yet have important political consequences for Syria and, more 
broadly, the entire Middle East region. 
The analysis of the political importance of the economic reforms flows from two 
assumptions that this thesis makes about Syria: (1) Asad, or a successor from within his 
regime, will be in power in Syria through 2010; and (2) an economic crisis is likely 
within Syria by 2010. The strength and validity of these assumptions are discussed in the 
body of the thesis. For now, these assumptions help formulate two crucial questions. 
First, the Asad regime survived the 1985-1991 economic crisis; will 'the regime-as it is 
likely to exist in 2010--be able to survive the coming crisis? Additionally, if the regime 
is unlikely to survive, what is the most likely political outcome ofthe crisis? 
To help answer these questions, Chapter II of this thesis explores the theoretical 
relationship between economics and political change. Three models of political change 
are outlined: a structural mode~ a strategic interaction mode~ and a political economy 
model. The chapter justifies the selection of the political economy model as the 
ix 
framework for inquiry into the Syrian case. The details of the political economy model 
are found in Chapter II. Here, it is sufficient to note that the model assumes that 
authoritarian regimes answer to some constituency-even if it is simply the military 
elite-and that economic crisis and reform can threaten the allegiance of this 
constituency, creating a transitional situation in which political regime change is possible. 
Chapter III demonstrates the applicability of the political economy model to the 
Syrian case by explaining the survival of the Asad regime during the 1985-1991 
economic crisis. The Asad regime was well situated to survive the crisis because its 
relationship to its constituency-the military elite, the Ba'th party, and the public 
economic sector-was strong. This strength is demonstrated by examining the regime 
type, elite cohesion, and the availability of external rent as they existed within Syria in 
1985. 
Going further, Chapter IV uses the same political economy model and applies it to 
a hypothetical Syrian economic crisis in 2010. By exploring the political and economic 
legacies of the post-1985 "selective liberalization" program, the chapter demonstrates 
that the Asad regime will t;lot likely survive the 2010 crisis intact. Specifically, in 
response to the 1985 crisis, the regime altered its power base-incorporating the private 
business sector-while distancing itself from the Ba'th party and the public economic 
sector. This change in the social base ofthe Asad regime, shown through the actions and 
rhetoric of the regime itself, created a newly empowered business sector capable of 
pushing for institutionalized political reform during the coming crisis. The final section 
of Chapter IV predicts the specific political outcome of the coming political instability by 
examining the interests of, and resources available to, the competing factions that will 
oppose, or favor, further institutionalized political reform. The chapter tentatively 
concludes that transition to democracy is the most likely political outcome, although elite 
miscalculation could lead to insurrection or a narrowed military dictatorship. 
x 
In summary, this thesis reexamines the political importance of the economic 
reforms undertaken by the Asad regime in response to the 1985-1991 economic crisis. It 
concludes that political instability is likely within Syria and, somewhat more tentatively, 
that democratization is the most likely political outcome of the turmoil. These 
conclusions are important for two reasons. First, they serve as a warning to U.S. 
policymakers, suggesting that regional stability will remain elusive until the root causes 
of regional economic underperformance are addressed. Additionally, by explaining the 
political outcome of the 1985 crisis with a political economy model, this thesis 





From 1985 to 1991, Syria experienced a severe economic crisis. In response to 
the crisis, the regime of Hafiz al-Asad implemented a series of economic reforms 
designed to stimulate growth and investment by moving the Syrian economy from state-
dominated socialism toward free-market capitalism. This thesis analyzes the long-term 
political effects of these economic reforms on the stability of the Asad regime and the 
prospects for future democratization within Syria.! The analysis of the political and 
economic legacies of the 1985-1991 economic crisis reaches two conclusions: (1) the 
long-term prospects for stability of the Asad regime are poor; and (2) democratization is 
the most probable long-term political outcome. 
The topic is salient in 1998 for two reasons. First, Syria is an important actor in a 
region deemed vital to U.S. national security by the Clinton administration.2 U.S. 
experience in the Middle East over the last thirty years has consistently demonstrated that 
Syria simply cannot be ignored. Recent research even points to an historical connection 
between internal Syrian disorder and aggressive Syrian foreign policy-research that is 
no doubt disturbing to important U.S allies in Israel and Turkey.3 The issue- of Syrian 
1 ''Long-term'' in this context refers out to about the year 2010. The stability of the Asad regime is 
examined because this thesis assumes that Asad, or his successor from within the current regime, will 
remain in control of Syria through 2010. Due to the documented poor health of Asad and the authoritarian 
nature of his regime, there is no consensus among scholars regarding the validity of this assumption. For a 
discussion of possible succession scenarios see Glenn Robinson, ''Elite Cohesion, Regime Succession and 
Political Instability in Syria," Middle East Policy, Vol. V, No.4 (January 1998), pp. 173-177. For an 
analysis supporting the assumption that the post-Asad transition will most likely occur smoothly, see 
Volker Perthes, The Political Economy o/Syria under Asad (London: LB. Tauris, 1995), pp. 269-270. For 
a more pessimistic analysis of the prospects for stability following the death of Asad, see Patrick Seale, 
"Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy," in Syria: SOCiety, Culture, and Polity, eds. Richard T. Antoun 
and Donald Quataert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). Adequately supporting or 
refuting this assumption is outside the bounds of this thesis. 
2 William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy 0/ Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 42-43. 
3 Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years o/Confrontation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996). 
regime stability is integral to the overall stability of the Middle East and thus to vital U.S. 
national security interests. 
Secondly, the third wave of democratization brought new life to the long-running 
debate regarding the relationship between political and economic development.4 Adam 
przeworski is not alone when he asserts that during the past few decades many countries 
have undertaken "interdependent" transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and 
from socialism to capitalism. 5 Yet, tlte Syrian case of economic reform toward 
capitalism has rarely been examined in truly comparative fashion relative to these other 
cases of economic liberalization, most of which occurred in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, and Southeast Asia. All too often, scholars have attributed political outcomes in 
Syria-and more broadly in the entire Middle Eastern region--to regionally specific 
causes, often cultural in nature, and not independent variables generally applicable in any 
regional setting.6 This thesis takes on this traditional "orientalist" approach to examining 
the Middle East by ignoring it, and attempting to explain political outcomes within Syria 
in terms of independent variables applicable in any political setting. This thesis is 
important because it demoI1$"ates the applicability of a theory generated in other parts of 
the world to the Middle East, undercutting the notion of regional exceptionalism. 
Methodologically, this thesis employs a longitudinal case study research design. 
Two cases are considered-Syria in- 1985 and Syria in 2010. The 1985 case 
demonstrates the applicability of the theoretical framework used, which is one of political 
economy. The 2010 case forms the basis for predicting the long-term prospects for 
regime stability and democratization within Syria. 
4 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
5 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. ix. 
6 For one example of a cultural explanation of political processes in the Middle East see Francis Fukuyama, 
The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992), p. 217. 
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Organizationally, this thesis is divided into five chapters, including the 
introduction. The second chapter contains a literature review that examines the 
theoretical relationship between economics and politics, emphasizing the relationship 
between economic change and political development toward democracy. Three 
competing models of political development are presented: a structural modeL a strategic 
interaction modeL and a political economy model. For readers more interested in the 
application of the model to the Syrian case than the derivation of the modeL this chapter 
can be skipped without losing track of the general argument being made. The chapter 
justifies the selection of the political economy model as the framework for inquiry into 
the Syrian cases. 
Chapter three contains the first case study-an analysis of the 1985-1991 Syrian 
economic crisis. First, the chapter generates a prediction regarding the outcome of the 
crisis using the political economy model. Then, the chapter compares the predicted and 
observed political outcomes of the crisis and notes that the model adequately predicts and 
explains the political outcome. The congruence between the predicted and observed 
outcomes establishes the strength and applicability of the political economy model to the 
Syrian case. 
The strength and applicability of the model established, chapter four examines the 
prospects for regime stability and democratization within Syria during a notional 
economic crisis occurring in 2010.7 The evidence presented supports the following 
conclusions: (1) the long-term prospects for stability of the Asad regime are poor; and (2) 
the most likely long-term political outcome is transition to democracy, although 
7 The use of a notional economic crisis must be defended. This analysis makes two assumptions that 
dictate the use of a future economic crisis as the basis for examining the long-term stability of the Asad 
regime. It is assumed that regime change will not occur in Syria dming periods of economic abundance, 
and that an economic crisis is likely in Syria arOlmd the year 2010. For purposes of clarity and consistency, 
this thesis arbitrarily assumes that the economic crisis will occur in 2010. This date, whenever referred to 
in this thesis, should be read as "approximately in the year 2010, plus or minus about five years." 
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insurrection or military coup cannot be entirely ruled out as possible, though less likely, 
outcomes. The final chapter reiterates the conclusions reached by the analysis. 
In summary, this thesis examines the economic liberalization efforts undertaken 
by the Asad regime in response to the 1985-1991 economic crisis using an existing 
political economy theory that has, until now, been infrequently applied to the Middle 
East. The model seems quite capable of explaiIllng political outcomes of economic crises 
in the region, undercutting the arguments of scholars that prefer to focus on the ''unique'' 
cultural nature of the region in explaining political processes. This thesis disturbingly 
concludes that political instability is likely in Syria, calling into question the prospects for 
stability of the entire Middle East region-a region deemed vital to U.S. national security 
interests by the Clinton administration. Ironically, the analysis presented also indicates 
that the outcome of this instability might just be the one outcome that most scholars and 
policy makers would never expect to see in the Middle East-democratization. 
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ll. ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
The third wave of democratization, which lasted from 1974 to 1990, rejuvenated 
the long-running debate concerning the origins of liberal democracy. The third wave 
reshaped the global political landscape-by 1994 fifty-eight percent of all world 
governments were democratic, and the overall number of democratic governments had 
doubled since 1972. 1 Yet, the debate concerning the roots of democracy has always 
been-either explicitly or implicitly-about the role of economics in political processes. 
Some scholars see political change toward democracy as a product of economic 
development, while others discount the role of economics, and focus on elite actions and 
preferences. 
This chapter organizes, explains, and evaluates the major theories of democratic 
transition. Throughout, the role of economics in each theory will be carefully detailed. 
Three general theories, or models, of democratic transition are presented-the structural 
model, the strategic interaction model, and the political economy model. 2 Finally, this 
chapter justifies the selection of the political economy model as a framework for inquiry 
into the long-term prospects for regime stability and democratization in Syria. 
A. THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
Early attempts to explain democratization searched for structural conditions that 
explained the localized development of democracy in Western Europe and North 
America. In attempting to discern which specific conditions gave rise to democracy, 
scholars analyzed socioeconomic conditions, social-structural conditions, political 
1 Doh Chull Shin, "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory 
and Research," World Politics, Vol. 47, No.1 (October 1994), p. 136. 
2 Throughout this thesis, these models are referred to as "the" political economy model or ''the'' structural 
model. This should not be interpreted as belief in the existence of only one variant of each theory. As the 
analysis of each theory below demonstrates, there are many versions of each theory. For purposes of 
clarity and consistency, this thesis refers to ''the'' structural model rather than getting bogged down in 
relatively unimportant-for the purposes of this thesis-distinctions that can be made within each model. 
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culture, political institutions, and international political and economic conditions.3 These 
are structural factors. The presence, or absence, of these factors in the fabric--or 
structure--of a given society dictated the prospects for democratization. These works are 
often referred to as the structural model of democratic transitions. Seymour Martin 
Lipset and Barrington Moore Jr. contributed to the structural model, and their work 
highlights the diversity of structural conditions incorporated into the model and the 
common intellectual approach used in the structural literature. 
1. The Structural Models of Lipset and Moore 
Seymour Martin Lipset was one of the earliest and most recognized proponents of 
the structural model. He wanted to "be able to point to a set of conditions that have 
actually existed in a number of countries, and say: democracy has emerged out of these 
conditions. The conditions listed must be ones which differentiate most democratic states 
from most others.',4 He concluded that high levels of both economic development and 
institutional legitimacy were necessary prerequisites for a stable democracy. 5 
Methodologically, Lipset sought a statistical correlation between economic 
development and democracy. Economic development consisted of four components-
wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education-each operationalized by 
quantifiable indicators. Lipset categorized each country as either a democracy or a 
dictatorship, and calculated average levels of each indicator for each grouping.6 The data 
3 Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No.4 (December 1995), pp. 882-884. 
4 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53 (1959), p. 69. 
5 Lipset remains well known today primarily for the economic development portion of his work. This is 
largely due to the fact that Lipset himself attributed the development of political legitimacy to factors 
associated with economic development, blurring any meaningful distinction between the two variables. 
Legitimacy, the beliefby the people that the current set of political institutions were proper, was tied to the 
ability of the middle class to be politically moderate-a capacity Lipset equated with ''urbanization, 
education, communications media, and increased wealth." (Lipset, p. 97.) 
6 Lipset also divided countries into geographical regions, between which his definition of "democracy" and 
"dictatorship" varied slightly. In general, he was attempting to divide all countries into two categories-
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demonstrated a significant statistical correlation between economic development and 
democracy. In Europe, for example, stable democracies had an average per capita 
income of $695, compared to an average per capita income of $308 in unstable 
democracies and dictatorships. 7 This general trend of higher levels of economic 
development correlating with higher levels of democracy existed across numerous 
statistical categories and geographical areas. 
To be convincing, however, the Lipset model had to explain how increased 
economic development led to increased levels of democracy. He postulated a "cluster" of 
forces linking the two variables. Economic development improved the material existence 
of the lower class, and created a burgeoning middle class that would have a stake in the 
continued success of the system. This reality would force the new middle class to adopt 
gradualist political views-views that Lipset deemed conducive to both compromise and 
democracy. Lipset also argued that increased educational levels-a key component of 
economic development-caused an increased belief in democratic norms within society. 
These norms, in turn, made democracy more likely. Lipset also thought democracy more 
likely in wealthy states because increased wealth led to an increase in activity in civil 
society, although he offered no direct explanation as to how a robust civil society fostered 
democracy. The last part of this cluster of forces linking economic development and 
democracy was Protestantism. Lipset drew from Max Weber and pointed out that the 
emphasis on individual responsibility in Protestantism, led to democracy.s In conclusion, 
Lipset noted, ''we have an integrated cluster of eco-nomic development, Protestantism, 
monarchy, gradual political change, legitimacy and democracy. Men may argue as to 
''more'' and "less" democratic. The mechanics of making the split varied along geographical lines to 
attempt to account for cross-regional differences. See Lipset pp. 73-74. 
7 Ibid. 
S Lipset failed to realize that by counting Protestantism as a social requisite of democracy, he weakened his 
thesis. If Weber is correct, and Protestantism leads to capitalism (and thus economic development) then 
Protestantism, not economic development, is the important explanatory variable. 
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whether any aspect of this cluster is primary, but the cluster of factors and forces hangs 
together.,,9 
Obviously, the structural model did not deal with economic factors alone. Lipset 
himself attempted to include social factors into his discussion of the development of 
democracy, but his analysis of political legitimacy is weaker than the economic 
development portion of his work. Barrington Moore Jr., however, focused more narrowly 
on structural social conditions and their role in the process of democratization in his 1966 
book Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of 
the Modern World. Moore dealt with democracy as only one part of a broader issue, that 
of modernization. He proposed three paths into the modem world: the path of peasant 
revolution that led to communism, the path of conservative revolution that led to fascism, 
and the path of bourgeoisie revolution that led to democracy.l0 The path taken by any 
particular country was a function of social structural variables within the country. 
Moore identified the social conditions vital to the development of democracy, and 
they centered around the pivotal role of the bourgeoisie-''No bourgeois, no 
democracy."u The rise of the bourgeoisie into a politically potent force was the key 
event along the road to democracy. This rise could be explained by analyzing three 
variables-the relationship of the landed upper class with the monarchy, the response of 
the landed upper class to the requirements of production, and the relations of the landed 
upper class to the bourgeoisie. 12 Democracy, for Moore, was the result of a peculiar type 
of social revolution-a type of revolution possible only when certain structural social 
conditions led to the development of the bourgeois into a politically relevant force. 
9 Lipset, p. 85. 
10 Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: The Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. xi-xii. 
11 Ibid., p. 418. 
12 Ibid., p. 423. 
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2. The Utility of the Structural Model 
The structural model is solidly grounded in large quantities of both theoretical and 
empirical research. Although controversia~ ''the correlation initially observed by Lipset 
between measures of economic development and democracy has remained one of the 
strongest findings in political science.,,13 Higher levels of certain socioeconomic factors 
correlate with the establishment and survival of democracy. 
Yet, this correlation has little meaning if the causal process linking the two 
variables is weak. Theories "of regime change that focus only on structural factors of 
this sort are inherently problematic: although they identify factors that may facilitate 
regime change, they do not consider the processes that actually bring it about and 
therefore cannot fully explain its causes.,,14 The underlying problem is that the structural 
model presumed a fairly linear, worldwide shift to democracy. As nations modernized, 
they would tend to become more democratic. IS By the early 1970's, the general 
acceptance of the structural model led many scholars to the conclusion that global 
prospects for democratization in the short-term were dim because not many countries 
possessed the requisite traits the model deemed necessary-such as a vibrant 
bourgeousie. "Virtually all of the leading concepts and approaches in comparative 
politics ... addressed the disappointments of the colonial period, the failures of 
modernization theory, and the related prevalence of authoritarian modes of political 
domination.,,16 
The unexpected transitions to democracy that occurred during the third wave 
called this pessimistic outlook for democracy into question. The structural model of 
democratic transition-which views the presence of certain socioeconomic factors as 
13 Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufinan, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 27. 
14 Gasiorowski, p. 883. Emphasis in original. 
15 On this specific point Moore differed by postulating three distinct paths into the modern world. 
16 Karen L. Remner, "New Theoretical Perspectives on Democracy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No.1 
(October 1995), p. 103. 
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crucial to the development of democracy-simply could not explain the wide variety of 
socioeconomic conditions exhibited by countries that transitioned to democracy from 
1974 to 1990. This theoretical shortfall led to a reexamination of the structural model 
and to the development of a model that focused on the importance of human agency in 
the transition process-the strategic interaction model 
B. THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION MODEL 
The strategic interaction model differs from the structural model in one 
fundamental respect. It assumes that transitions to democracy are chaotic, and this chaos 
makes transitions underdetermined-''there are insufficient structural or behavioral 
parameters to guide and predict [outcomes]. ,,17 If true, this assumption explains the 
failure of the structural model to anticipate the third wave. O'Donnell and Schmitter 
propose that in the chaotic situation accompanying any given transition, outcomes are 
uncertain and the actions of politically relevant actors are decisive in determining the 
outcome. The literature that comprises the strategic interaction model operates under 
four general assumptions: 
First, the key actors in the transition process are political elites, whether in 
the government or opposition, not interest groups, mass organizations, 
social movements, or classes. Second, actors are typically defined in terms 
of their orientation toward regime change (hardliners-soft liners, 
moderates-extremists) rather than by interests rooted, in economic 
structures and conditions or institutional roles. Third, actors behave 
strategically; their actions are influenced by ,expectations concerning the 
behavior of allies and rivals. Finally, democratization is the outcome of 
explicit or implicit negotiation. I8 
17 Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe C. Schmitter, eds., Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies, vol. 4 of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, eds. Guillermo 
O'Donnell, Phillipe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), p. 3. 
18 Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufinan, "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions," 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No.3 (April 1997), p. 265. 
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Yet, the literature regarding the strategic interaction model is not monolithic. 
Karen L. Remner prefers to use three separate models~lite compromise, decentralized 
strategic choice, and rational choice--instead of the broader grouping of strategic 
interaction. 19 Such distinctions are not necessary here, as they serve to confuse more than 
clarify. Instead, the works of Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Adam 
Przeworski are examined, as they are diverse enough to represent the specific areas 
highlighted by Remner. 
1. The Strategic Interaction Models of O'Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Przeworski 
O'Donnell and Schmitter first outlined the strategic interaction model in the 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. 20 The strategic interaction model 
views democracy in a very different manner than the structural model. The structural 
approach viewed democracy "as a particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be 
transplanted in alien SOil."21 Structural conditions determined whether or not the "soil" in 
a given country was able to support the "delicate plant" of democracy. O'Donnell and 
Schmitter broke with this viewpoint. To them, authoritarian rule was the exception, not 
democracy-the Second World War had undercut the ability of authoritarian regimes to 
propose their methods as a viable "long-term solution" to political problems. They 
believed that this inherent lack of legitimacy was the "Achilles' heel" of authoritarian 
rulers, and thought that it explained the tendency of authoritarian regimes to search for 
public legitimization at any available turn.22 
19 Remner, p. 104. 
20 O'Donnell, and Schmitter, p. 3. The authors specifically avoid the terms ''theory'' and "model" because 
they believed that a comprehensive theory of transitions was not possible, due to the previously discussed 
indeterminacy involved in the processes. Yet, their work does offer an explanatory model in one important 
way-it attempts to explain a complex phenomenon by reducing the process to its essential components. 
21 Shin, p. 14l. 
22 O'Donnell, and Schmitter, p. 15. Published in 1986, O'Donnell and Schmitter seem premature in 
making this pessimistic judgement about authoritarianism. In 1986, the USSR still provided a viable 
blueprint for authoritarian regimes to emulate. 
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O'Donnell and Schmitter attribute the commencement of liberalization efforts to 
internal political events-not socioeconomic factors. There "is no transition whose 
beginning is not the consequence-direct or indirect-{)f important divisions within the 
authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners 
and soft-liners.,,23 Additionally, ''the timing of an opening toward liberalization [cannot] 
be correlated predictably with the performance of authoritarian rulers in meeting 
socioeconomic goals. ,,24 During economic good times, political liberalization may occur 
to obtain public legitimization of issues concerning succession to executive power, and in 
bad times liberalization efforts may occur to attempt to rectify the failure of the regime to 
deliver prosperity. 
Once a liberalization effort is underway, the specific outcome is the product of the 
strategic interaction of the hard-liners and soft-liners. One overarching force that will 
shape the outcome is the role of the military in the process-hard-liners depend upon the 
military to prevent coups, and soft-liners attempt to co-opt the military to avoid 
repression. This hard-linerlsoft-liner dynamic is eventually resolved either through the 
repression of the reformers or through the generation of pacts that provide guarantees for 
the exiting authoritarian elite. Thus, democracy is "a product that can be manufactured 
wherever there is democratic craftsmanship and the proper zeitgeist. ,,25 
Adam Przeworski contributes significantly to the strategic interaction model in his 
1991 book Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. First, he challenges the very logic of social requisites for' 
democracy, and offers a compelling argument in support of the idea that democracy can 
survive almost anywhere, if certain types of institutions can be created.26 Secondly, he 
23 Ibid., p. 19. 
24 Ibid., p. 20. 
25 Shin, p. 141. 
26 Przeworski, pp. 1-51. Przeworski acknowledges that the structure of certain conflicts may not be able to 
be solved by any set of democratic institutions.' He cites race and religion as two types of conflicts that 
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explicitly deals with the mechanics of strategic interaction--especially the driving forces 
behind the hard-linerlsoft-liner dynamic. 
Przeworski uses game theory and logic to examine the idea of socialrequisites for 
democracy. The fundamental issue in democracy. is compliance-if the losers in a 
democratic process comply with the outcome, then it is likely that the democracy will be 
stable. Three alternative methods of ensuring compliance are postulated: spontaneous 
decentralized self-enforcing compliance, externally imposed compliance, and norm-based 
compliance. Przeworski argues that if spontaneous self-enforcing compliance can be 
created, then external enforcement and norms-based compliance are unnecessary. These 
. types of outcomes can be created by institutions that create "repeated situations in which 
actors do not discount the future, and the probability of the game ending in any particular 
round islow.,,27 
Przeworski also strengthens the strategic interaction model by clearly identifying 
the possible outcomes of the liberalization process, and critically examining how each 
outcome can be reached. He identifies five possible outcomes: status quo dictatorship, 
broadened dictatorship, narrowed dictatorship, insurrection, and transition At each stage 
in the . liberalization process, relevant actors are faced with important decisions regarding 
whom they will support, and what policies they will pursue. Przeworski's model uses the 
values and preferences of relevant political groups at each important decision point to 
predict the rational choices that each actor would make, and thus the outcome of the 
entire liberalization process. 
democratic institutions may not be able to smmount Overall, his analysis still views the prospects for 
democracy in various countries more favorably than does the structural model. 
27 Ibid., p. 25. 
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2. The Utility of the Strategic Interaction Model 
The strategic interaction model makes several important advances. It removes 
structural and cultural biases by asserting that democracy can function almost anywhere 
in the world. A Jeffersonian commitment to democratic norms is not required-self-
interest and fair and effective institutions alone can lead to democracy. The strategic 
interaction model assumes that "political democracy is not [the] politicalsystem of a 
particular level or historical pattern of development but a consensual· framework or 
cooperative equilibrium that may be achieved in a variety of ways .... ,,28 Additionally, 
the model allows insight into the processes of transition, which the structural model 
neglected, allowing for a more thorough analysis of the causal relationships involved. 
Yet, is the role of strategic actors overemphasized? To be useful, the model 
requires knowledge of the identity and preference structure of the major actors-
knowledge that can only be obtained by exploring factors ignored by the strategic 
interaction model, such as political institutions and economics. Without examining 
institutional and economic influences on the creation of elite preferences, the strategic 
interaction model can devolve into a strategic "choice" model in which elites can 
apparently opt for democracy whenever and wherever they choose. 
Additionally, the focus on process is overemphasized. Stephan Haggard and 
Robert Kaufinan point out that ''the key issue concerns ... not the presence of a negotiation 
process, but rather the resources contending parties bring to bear" on that process.29 The 
distribution of resources between relevant groups will, in part, determine the outcome-
an effect that the strategic interaction model cannot account for. 
Lastly, the strategic interaction model ignores the importance of economics in the 
creation of ''political'' preferences. These shortcomings led to the development of an 
28 Remner, p. 111. 
29 Haggard and Kaufinan, ''Political Economy of Democratic Transitions," p. 266. 
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alternative approach to explaining democratization--the political economy model of 
democratic transition--that accepts the important role of the strategic elite in determining 
outcomes, but contends that economic concerns significantly constrain elite action. 
C. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL 
The political economy model uses aspects of both the structural and strategic 
interaction models to predict and explain the relationship between political and economic 
development. The model accepts the general thesis of the strategic interaction model-
that the path followed during ''regime change .. .is ultimately determined by the strategic 
choices of key actors.,,30 Yet, the political economy model differs in that it accounts for 
economic circumstances and existing institutions that constrain elite action and influence 
political outcomes. The model goes further than both the structural and strategic 
interaction models by examining the effect of economics and state level institutions on 
the process of democratization. 
1. The Political Economy Model of Haggard and Kaufman 
The political economy model outlined by Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman 
in their 1995 book The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions is shaped by one 
crucial assumption it makes about the nature of authoritarian regimes. It assumes that to 
"survive, [authoritarian regimes] must accommodate the interests of some constituency; 
they are accountable to someone, if only the military establishment or other sectors within 
the state elite. ,,31 Authoritarian regimes can last only as long as they engender this crucial 
support. In explaining and predicting political outcomes, the political economy model 
initially examines one independent variable: the durability of the authoritarian bargain, or 
30 Haggard and Kaufinan, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, p. 5. 
31 Ibid., p. 11. Emphasis in original. 
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agreement, between the regime and critical segments of society. Regimes with durable 
authoritarian bargains will remain in power longer than regimes with fragile authoritarian 
bargains. 32 Only if a regime has a fragile authoritarian bargain will the strategic 
interaction of elite groups affect the political outcome. 
The model also contends that the economic crisis is a necessary but insufficient 
cause for political liberalization in authoritarian regimes. Short-term economic crisis can 
lead to the abandonment of the authoritarian bargain. An economic crisis-an across the 
board economic slump that is not self-correcting-"creates incentives for the . private 
sector to defect from [the authoritarian] bargain, increases the likelihood of political 
protest from below, and reduces the capacity of ruling elites to manage the resulting 
distributive conflicts.,,33 The inability of the economy to self-correct is vital because 
-economic policy changes will be required to restore economic growth-politics enters the 
debate. 
Political decisions regarding economic policy can cause or exacerbate splits 
within the ruling elite. If the authoritarian bargain is fragile, these splits make regime 
survival unlikely, and the strategic interaction model is used to explain the specific 
political outcome. Three possible outcomes exist, according to Przeworski, transition to 
democracy, narrowed dictatorship, or insurrection. If, however, the regime has a durable 
authoritarian bargain, then the regime will likely survive an economic crisis by 
implementing limited reforms. The possible political outcomes in this instance are status 
32 If not carefully employed, the use of the durability of the authoritarian bargain could become 
tautological: that is, regimes survive because they are durable. Yet, as it is used here, the variable has true 
explanatory power. First, the durability of the authoritarian bargain is operationalized with three 
independent indicators that are meaningful measures in their own right, and not simply tautological 
reflections of the outcome. Secondly, the model as described here uses a two-step process to explain a 
specific political outcome of an economic crisis and not simply the success or failure of an authoritarian 
regime to survive. (To this end, the second step of the analysis introduces the concepts of elite preference, 
resources and actions.) A tautology that rested solely on the durability of the authoritarian bargain could 
not, as the political economy model can, account for the observed variation of the dependant variable from 
status quo dictatorship to transition to democracy. 
33 Ibid., p. 7. 
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quo dictatorship or broadened dictatorship, in which the regime is successful in 
expanding the authoritarian bargain to include previously neglected groups. 
Predicting political outcomes of economic crises then becomes a two-step 
process. First, the durability of the authoritarian bargain is established. If it is durable, 
then the regime will likely survive. If the bargain is fragile, the model examines the 
preferences and resources of the competing groups to determine the outcome. 
To effectively employ the model, the independent variable, durability of the 
authoritarian bargain, must be operationaliz~d. Haggard and Kaufman identify three 
indicators of the durability of the bargain. The first indicator is regime type~ominant 
party regimes have an ideological basis for rule that enables the government both to 
justify reform efforts to the important actors and aid in the avoidance of crisis by limiting 
dissent over economic policy prior to a crisis. Military regimes "lack both a long-term 
rationale for staying in power and the organizational channels for building stable bases of 
support," and thus are more likely to fall during an economic crisiS.34 The second 
indicator of the durability of the bargain is the availability of external rent. External rent 
reduces the effect of structural inadequacies in an economy by providing "easy" access to 
foreign exchange. In crisis situations rent is an important flow of funds that often allows 
the regime to enact structural reforms that would otherwise be untenable. The rent allows 
the state to directly co-opt important actors as the overall economic performance of the 
economy declines. Lastly, the cohesion of the elite structure is an indicator of the 
durability of the authoritarian bargain. In both military and dominant party regimes, a ' 
unified elite structure makes regime survival more likely during economic crises. 
In summary, the political economy model asserts that a democratic transition can 
occur only when relevant political actors force change upon a ruling regime. Regime 
survival thus depends upon the durability of the authoritarian bargain. Economic crises 
34 Ibid., p. II. 
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call these bargains into question as the distributional effects of economic reform create 
new incentives and preferences for the important actors, creating a transitional situation 
that a regime may, or may not, survive. 
2. The Utility of the Political Economy Model 
The political economy model of democratic transitions improves upon the 
strategic interaction model in several ways. It critically evaluates the factors that shape 
actor preferences and actions. It emphasizes economic factors and institutional realities 
that constrain elite action. However, the model is not perfect. The major criticism of this 
model is that it has little statistical support-an extensive statistical analysis of the model 
has not yet been conducted.3s Anecdotally, the relationship .between economic crisis and 
regime change is shown in evidence presented by Haggard and Kaufman. They assert 
that in studying twenty-seven transitions between 1950 and 1989, twenty-one cases 
demonstrated "poor growth, increasing inflation, or both" in the years directly preceding 
the transition. 36. Further empirical research into the relationship between economic crisis 
and authoritarian regime stability is obviously needed, but until more conclusive evidence 
is presented, the political economy model seems to offer unique and powerful insight into 
democratic transitions. 
35 In one of the few statistical analyses of economic crisis and regime change, Mark Gasiorowski refutes the 
assertion that poor economic growth caused the failure of authoritarian regimes from 1950 to 1989. See 
Gasiorowski, pp. 892-894. He also demonstrates that inflationary crises only began to lead to 
democratization in the late 1980's. Gasiorowski called for skepticism in the interpretation of his results, 
however, as the conclusions drawn from his preliminary analysis are not convincing enough to call the 
assumptions upon which the political economy model is based into question. Further empirical research 
into the relationship between economic crisis and authoritarian regime stability is needed before the model 
~ be dismissed strictly on statistical data. 
36 Haggard and Kaufinan, Political Economy of Democratic TransitiOns, p. 33. 
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D. SELECTING A THEORETICAL MODEL 
Selecting one model of democratic transition over another is a fundamental aspect 
of research design. Each model emphasizes certain factors while down playing others. 
Each shapes the selection and presentation of evidence-and thus the conclusions of the 
analysis. Yet, theory is vital. Without it, inquiry tends to devolve into descriptive 
accounts of individual cases. "Theoretical issues are essential for identifying and 
comparing the dominant and distinctive forces shaping the cUrrent wave of 
democratization.,,37 With the limitations of any theory in mind, the remainder of this 
thesis examines the prospects for regime stability and democratization in Syria using the 
political economy model. Notwithstanding the weak statistical support for the model, it 
offers the best prospect of understanding the impact of ongoing economic reform efforts 
in Syria. The model allows for reasonable, useful predictions about both regime stability 
and prospects for democratization. While imperfect, it is better suited to the Syrian case 
than any of the other models. 
The structural model provides little insight into the Syrian experience. Syria is a 
middle income country, and as such, the economic development argument made by 
Lipset offers little predictive power-some middle-income nations are democratic, and 
some are not. The social structural argument presented by Moore is ill suited for short-
term analysis. If the third wave of democratization demonstrated anything, it was that in 
the short-term, the strategic interaction of important actors could iead to the exit of 
authoritarian regimes and the installation of democratic institutions--even in countries 
that, according to Moore, lacked the requisite social structure. It seems that the social 
structural argument offers more insight into the long-term viability of a given democracy. 
The strategic interaction model will not be used directly in analyzing the Syrian 
situation because it neglects one important factor that must be inc1uded--economics. 
37 Shin, p. 137. 
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While economics may not be the only explanatory variable, as suggested by Gasiorowsk~ 
it is too important in shaping actor preferences to omit completely. 
The political economy model offers an avenue to explore the prospects for regime 
stability and democratization within Syria in a balanced manner. Economics, institutions, 
and elite interaction are important factors that determine the durability of the 
authoritarian bargain and thus the ability of an authoritarian regime to remain in power. 
Only the political economy model gives each factor the credit it is due. 
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III. CASE 1: ECONOMIC CRISIS 1985-1991 
From 1985 to 1991, Syria experienced a severe economic crisis. l The political 
economy model outlined in Chapter II argues that such crises can lead to political 
instability and democratization in authoritarian regimes. This chapter analyzes the crisis 
of 1985-1991 through the framework of the political economy model-attempting to 
relate economic crisis and political outcome. 
First, the Syrian economic crisis of 1985-1991 is viewed in comparative 
perspective with the cases upon which Haggard and Kaufman base their model.· As the 
Syrian crisis is similar to these cases in both scope and cause, one would expect the 
political economy model to apply. Next, this chapter generates a prediction regarding the 
political outcome of the crisis by examining the durability of the Syrian authoritarian 
bargain in 1985. Finally, to evaluate both the predictive powers of the political economy 
model and its applicability to Syria, this chapter compares the predicted political outcome 
with the observed political outcome. 
. This chapter demonstrates the utility of the model by showing that the political 
economy model correctly anticipated that the Asad regime would survive the 1985-1991 
economic crisis intact. By extension, this conclusion implies that the political economy 
model is a tool that can be used to predict political outcomes of future economic crises in 
Syria-the task undertaken in Chapter IV. 
A. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The Syrian economy floundered in the late 1980s. Syrian gross domestic product 
(GDP) declined by 42 percent between 1985 and 1989 and inflation was high-during 
1 Dating the economic crisis is problematic. For example, Volker Perthes contends that the crisis, and 
subsequent economic reform effort, began in 1983. Yet, Perthes acknowledges that the crisis worsened in 
1985, and that reform efforts became "more visible." (perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p.47.) Here, 
Syrian GDP is used to date the crisis. In 1985, Syrian GDP declined by 9 percent It was not until 1991 
that GDP began to increase. Throughout this chapter, GDP data is from World Bank Tables 1995. 
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the 1980s, "retail prices increased about sevenfold, wages not more than twofold." 2 The 
standard of living for almost all Syrians declined precipitously from 1985 to 1991-
localized power outages and food shortages even led to popular unrest in 1988.3 
This dismal economic performance can be traced to the Syrian development 
strategy employed since the 1970s-import substitution industrialization (lSI). The 
approach was "designed to move economies traditionally dependent on the export of 
primary commodities and raw materials to an industrial footing.,,4 In theory, lSI would 
create and protect infant industries that would eventually become internationally 
competitive in the export market. Once achieved, this competitiveness would end Syrian 
economic dependency upon the developed world. In practice, the protection of these 
developing industries led to state-sanctioned monopolies and relatively high cost-low 
quality output-Syrian industry never became internationally competitive. 
The Syrian economy overcame these problems during the 1970s and early 1980s 
with external rent-which averaged between 10 and 15 percent of Syrian GDP during the 
period.5 The rent, primarily foreign aid, masked the structural inefficiencies engendered 
in the Syrian economy by the implementation of lSI. Foreign aid is an external rent in 
that it accrues directly to the Asad regime whether or not the local Syrian economy is 
generating capital. Thus, the regime is not forced to extract resources from society, and 
in many ways is not accountable to society for its actions. 
The majority of Syrian· foreign aid during this period origmated in the Persian 
Gulf states and the Soviet Union.6 "At the beginning of the 1980s, official capital inflow 
started to drop sharply, partly as a result of the fall in world oil demand and prices and 
2 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 28. 
3 Ibid., p. 121. 
4 Alan Richards and Richard Waterbwy, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 25. 
5 Throughout this chapter, data on foreign aid is from World Bank Tables 1995. Percentages calculated by 
author. 
6 Nabil Sukkar, "The Crisis of 1986 and Syria's Plan for Reform," in Contemporary Syria: Liberalization 
Between Cold War and Cold Peace ed. Eberhard Keinle (London: British Academy Press, 1994), p. 27. 
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the subsequent shortfall of resources in the Gulf, and partly as a result of differences with 
Syria over policies concerning the war between Iraq and Iran.,,7 As foreign aid dropped 
from 11.3 percent of GDP in 1980 to 4.8 percent of GDP in 1986, the Asad regime found 
itself in a difficult position. Syrian producers were unable to competitively export due to 
inferior product quality and unfavorable terms of trade. The loss of foreign aid-easy 
foreign exchange-triggered a foreign exchange crisis. 
Syrian "foreign exchange reserves dropped to about $357 million by the end of 
1986, representing less than one month's imports. The government found itself unable to 
meet its foreign exchange obligations as they fell due."s The crisis deepened, however, 
as the lack of foreign exchange crippled the public sector. Nabil Sukkar points out that as 
foreign aid dropped, the Syrian government was forced to borrow heavily, which 
''together with the severe product shortage and the plunge in the value of the currency 
caused a price explosion during 1986 and 1987.,,9 Using unofficial data, he estimates that 
inflation reached 100 percent annually during this period. 
In comparative perspective, the Syrian economic crisis of 1985-1991 was as 
severe as the five crisis cases. included by Haggard and Kaufman in their analysis of the 
political economy model. For example, Table 1 shows the overall economic performance 
of these cases during the four years prior to transition compared to the four worst years of 
the Syrian crisis. Additionally, like the five crisis cases considered by Haggard and 
Kaufman, the Syrian crisis of 1985-1991 was not self-correcting. The structural 
inefficiencies of the Syrian economy engendered by the lSI development plan meant that 
a fundamental macroeconomic restructuring of the Syrian economy was required to 
restore long-term growth. IO 
7 Ibid. 
S Ibid., p. 28. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Przeworski, p. 118, for a theoretical explanation of why economic crises in socialist countries are not 
self-correcting. Basically, he argues that without an effective price mechanism linking individuals to the 
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Source: Data for all countries except Syria is from Haggard and Kaufman, Political 
Economy of Democratic Transitions, Table 2.1, pp. 47-48. Data for Syria from World 
Bank Tables 1995. Averages calculated by author. 
Severe and not self-correcting, the Syrian economic crisis of 1985-1991 
demanded immediate economic reform to correct structural economic deficiencies. This 
type of reform-because it creates new winners and losers-is political reform as much 
as it is economic reform. The political economy model points out that during periods of 
economic crisis and reform, groups within the authoritarian bargain may rethink their 
commitment to the regime-opening a window of vulnerability which the authoritarian 
regime may, or may not, survive. 
B. THE PREDICTED POLITICAL OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS 
Whether or not an authoritarian regime survives an economic crisis is, according 
to the political economy model, a function of the durability of the authoritarian bargain. 
Since the basic tenet of the model is that "except in cases of military defeat and foreign 
explains the prevalence of Five Year Programs in socialist states-they are in almost constant need of 
reform. 
11 According to World Bank data, Syrian inflation never exceeded 29 percent, and as shown averaged 27 
percent, from 1985 to 1989. As noted earlier in the text, lIDofficial figures indicate that inflation 
approached 100 percent. Using the more conservative figure in the table, it is noteworthy that the data is 
stilI comparable to data from the other cases. 
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occupation, the proximate cause for the exit of authoritarian regimes can almost always 
be found in splits within [the politico-military] elite," any factor that increases the 
durability of the authoritarian bargain increases the probability of regime survival12 The 
model uses a two step process to predict political outcomes of economic crises in 
authoritarian regimes. First, the model assesses the likelihood that an authoritarian 
regime will survive a crisis without significant political liberalization. Then, if it is likely 
that the regime will not be able to survive the crisis without political liberalization, the 
model predicts the specific political outcome using the strategic interaction model 
outlined in Chapter II.13 
To determine whether or not an authoritarian regime is likely to survive an 
economic crisis intact, the political economy model generates a testable hypothesis and 
examines one independent variable-the durability of the authoritarian bargain. The 
hypothesis is straightforward. Regimes with a durable authoritarian bargain are more 
likely to survive economic crises intact·than regimes with fragile authoritarian bargains. 
The durability of the bargain is measured by examining three indicators: regime type, 
elite cohesion, and the availability of external rent. 
In 1985, the Asad regime was a dominant party regime with high levels of elite 
cohesion. Furthermore, the regime had access to a substantial amount of external rent 
during the economic crisis. If adequately supported, the implications of these assertions 
are clear-the political economy model predicts that the Asad regime would survive an 
economic crisis with little accompanying political liberalization. 
12 Haggard and Kaufinan, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, p. 31. 
13 The strategic interaction model contends that political outcomes depend upon the preferences and 
resources of the important actors. The mechanics of this process in the Syrian case are developed more 
fully in the next chapter. 
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1. Regime Type-1985 
In the political economy model, regime type is an important indicator of the 
strength of the authoritarian bargain because the presence of a functioning dominant party 
can channel dissent, and dampen potential intra-elite cleavages. For the purposes of the 
model, two types of authoritarian regimes exist-dominant party regimes and military 
regimes. In a dominant party regime, the party provides a ''mechanism for co-opting and 
controlling social groups," and the party. and military are functionally separate.14 
Conversely, a military regime is one in which ''the military establishment itself 
constitutes the most important institutional framework for the recruitment of political 
leaders and the deliberation of policy issues.,,15 Placing an authoritarian regime within 
one of these two categories requires the exploration of two aspects of state-society 
relations: (l) whether or not the party provides a functional linkage between state and 
society, and (2) whether or not the party and military structures are functionally separate. 
The Asad regime of 1985 is particularly difficult to classify regarding regime 
type. The regime is often portrayed by scholars as a narrow, sectarian regime that 
survives only because of the c<;>ntinued support of the primarily Alawi military elite. This 
line of reasoning is attractive at first glance-Asad is an Alawi ruling a predominantly 
Sunni nation. He is a product of the military and still serves as the Commander in Chief 
of the armed services. He served as the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Air Forces, and he 
came to power militarily. Yet, this portrait of the Asad regime is incomplete and 
unsatisfying. For example, this sectarian view fails to explain the well-documented 
support of rural, non-Alawi segments of Syrian society for the Asad regime. A more 
thorough analysis of the roles of the Ba'th party and the military within Syrian society is 
required to determine the Asad regime type in 1985. 
14 Haggard and Kaufinan, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, p. 13. 
15 Ibid., pp. 11-12. Emphasis added. 
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a. The Role of the Ba'th Party 
The Asad regime is a Ba'thist regime. To understand the role of the party 
in Syria in 1985, it is necessary to analyze the socioeconomic and political factors that 
brought the Ba'th party to power in Syria in 1963. Raymond Hinnebusch, in 
Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba 'thist Syria, contends that the Ba'th party 
rose to power as an authoritarian-populist movement. This movement was a reaction 
against foreign occupation, imperialism, and capitalism-all of which poorly served the 
interests of the average Syrian peasant.16 In its ideal form, ''populist authoritarianism 
seeks to exclude the old oligarchy from power and challenges dominant interests in the 
name of nationalism and equality.,,17 The stated goals of the Syrian Ba'thist party that 
seized power in 1963-"Arab Unity, Freedom, and Socialism"-did not differ 
substantially from this ideal. 18 
The capture of state power by the Ba'th party was a military coup-a coup 
followed immediately by a social revolution implemented from above. The military 
elites that captured the state in 1963 were from predominantly poor rural backgrounds. 
Once in power, they enacted a program of social reforms aimed at improving the material 
conditions in rural communities, communities that had suffered under both mandatory 
and independent rule. This history helps explain the important relationship between the 
Ba'th party and the Syrian peasantry that will be further explored later in this chapter. 
When Asad seized power militarily in 1970, he was acting from within the 
Ba'th party structure-a structure that he immediately set out to strengthen. Asad did not 
want to repeat the mistake made by previous Syrian military leaders of failing to develop 
16 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), p. ix. 
17 Ibid., p. 2. 
18 ''Ba'th Party Constitution" in Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, ed. Sylvia G. Haim (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1962), p. 233. 
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an institution capable of linking state and society.19 The ideological underpinning of the 
party was not fundamentally altered, but the practical role of the party changed 
substantially. The party "became a ruling party, providing the backbone of the country's 
establishment, in fact a ladder of advancement for a new breed of careerists. ,,20 Party 
membership grew from 65,000 in 1971 to 537,000 in 1984, as the party became an 
effective instrument of social control.21 
By 1985, the Ba'th party "provided a framework for the maintenance of 
elite cohesion and an instrument for mass mobilization and control.,,22 The Asad regime 
was one of ritualized speech-"lack of inner conviction [was] acceptable as long as every 
single party member and official [was] prepared to demonstrate publicly hislher 
commitment to party and president.'.23 Ba'th party ideology, evoked in the 
aforementioned ritualized speech, was used by the Asad regime to justify the socialist 
structure and wartime footing of the Syrian economy-both of which served the social 
control interests of the regime far better than economic rationality. 
b. The Role of the Military 
To remain in power, every modem state relies to a certain degree upon the 
military and a monopoly of the coercive resources within the state?4 Thus, reliance upon 
military power is not, in and of itself, an indicator that an authoritarian regime is a 
19 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), pp. 169-177. 
20 Ibid., p. 175. 
21 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 155. During the same period, Syrian population grew from 
approximately 6.5 million to 10.0 million-Ba'th party membership rose from 1 percent to 5 percent of 
Syrian population. Although a relatively small percentage of the total population throughout the period 
being examined, the growth of party members is generally indicative of the rise of importance of the party. 
22 Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation, p. 12. 
23 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 161. 
24 See Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, 
eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985). 
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military regime. Rather, the important characteristic to consider is the extent to which the 
military and the party are functionally separate. 
The military and the Ba'th party in Syria were, at one time, intimately 
linked.2s In 1968, under the leadership of Salah Jadid, the military was well integrated 
into the party structure. Asad, as head of the Syrian Air Forces, wanted to challenge 
Jadid for control of the state-a task that would require military forces loyal only to 
Asad. Since the Jadid regime was a Ba'thist regime, Asad constructed military forces 
through selective appointments and purges ;in which Ba'thist ideology was toned down 
and loyalty to Asad was the paramount virtue an officer could possess. This functional 
separation of the military and the party continued after Asad took control of the state. To 
govern the fourteen Syrian provinces, three senior representatives are appointed for each 
region-a party secretary, a governor, and the head of political security. Of these high-
ranking officials, the party secretary is officially the most powerful. 26 Volker Perthes 
concludes, ''the security apparatus therefore does have a strong influence in all matters 
concerning state and regime security in the widest sense. But it no longer ... interferes 
much in economic policies or other 'civilian' policy fields.,,27 
In summary, by 1985 the Ba'th party had been institutionalized within 
Syrian society to the point that it provided an important link between the Asad regime 
and Syrian society. The party was a "real party with a long history, not a mere creation 
or appendage of leader, army, or bureaucracy. It [performed] crucial political 
functions ... "-namely linking state and society and providing an ideological justification' 
for the prevailing economic system and foreign policy of the Asad regime.28 
Additionally, the institutions established by Asad after seizing power in 1970 meant that, 
25 Here, the term ''military'' also refers to tmits such as the Republican Guards, which are separate in both 
chain of command and funding from traditional army and air force tmits. 
26 See Seale, "Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy," p. 101 for a discussion of the sometimes 
complex relationship between these three offices. 
27 Perthes, Political Economy o/Syria, p. 152. 
28 Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation, p. 312. 
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to a large degree, the military and party structures operated independently. The full 
nature of state-society relations in Syria in 1985 will be explored in greater detail in the 
following section. For now, this partial analysis has yielded one important conclusion-
in 1985, the Asad regime was a dominant party regime. 
2. Elite Cohesion-1985 
The political economy model contends that to remain in power, authoritarian 
regimes rely upon the continued support of key social groups. In return for their support, 
these groups are usually given resources and privileged positions within society. 
Together with the regime itself, these groups form the authoritarian bargain within an 
authoritarian state. Elite cohesion then becomes an important indicator of the durability 
of the bargain because highly cohesive elite groups are resistant to the formation of intra-
elite cleavages that can topple an authoritarian regime. Specifically, elite cohesion is a 
measure of the degree to which groups within the authoritarian bargain possess common 
interests and the degree to which these interests would be served by the continued 
existence of the regime. Defined in this manner, elite cohesion predicts the degree to 
which potentially competitive elite groups will cooperate to keep an authoritarian regime 
in power during economic crises. 
Thus, the nature of the authoritarian bargain must be understood before any 
attempt can be made to evaluate elite cohesion. The authoritarian bargain as it existed in 
Syria in 1985 is shown in Figure 1. The Asad regime relied upon the support of three 
groups to survive-the military elite, the public economic sector, and the Ba'th 
party/peasantry. 29 A detailed analysis of the relationship between the regime and each 
29 These are similar to the relevant actors identified by the political economy model outlined by Haggard 
and Kaufinan-political and military elite, private sector business, and middle class ''popular'' 
organizations. In the Syrian case, private sector business was simply excluded from the authoritarian 
bargain in 1985-a testament to the populist roots of the Ba'th party. The three support structures of the 
Asad regime are the same as those presented by Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation, p. 
156. For simplicity, the Ba'th party/peasantry group will be referred to as simply the Ba'th party group. 
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group is provided in the next three sections. For now, it is adequate to note that the 
military elite physically protected the regime, the party provided a mechanism for elite 
recruitment and co-optation of the rural peasantry, while the public economic sector 
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Figure 1. The Syrian Authoritarian Bargain in 1985 
The most important social group excluded from the Syrian authoritarian bargain 
in 1985, the private economic sector, is also shown in Figure 1. This group represented 
the interests of the "old oligarchy" that was removed from power by the Ba'th in 1963. 
The private economic sector in 1985 included all groups that would have benefited from 
economic liberalization toward a market economy. These primarily urban groups 
confronted the Asad regime and comprised a ''permanent opposition coalition. ,,30 
Figure 1 also demonstrates that some relationships were strong, while others were 
weak. The strength of the relationship varies with the degree of dependency of the 
regime upon the group and the degree to which the interests of the regime and the group 
30 Ibid., p. 315. 
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overlap. To determine a value for elite cohesion, it is necessary to evaluate the interests 
of each group within the authoritarian bargain relative to the interests of the regime.31 In 
each case, the assumption is made that the Asad regime wants to survive, and will pursue 
policies that in the opinion of the regime will increase the probability of survival in the 
future. 
a. The Military Elite and the Asad Regime 
In 1985, the Asad regime and the Syrian military elite had a strong, 
mutually dependent relationship. The military elite provided a cruc~ service to the 
regime-the maintenance of internal and external security. In return, the Asad regime 
provided the military with substantial resources-21.8 percent of Syrian GDP in 1985 
alone. 32 There was no indication that the regime wanted to significantly cut military 
expenditures-expenditures that had averaged 15.3 percent of GDP since Asad came to 
power. Ideologically, the regime's stance toward Israel justified the elevated status of the 
military in Syrian society and the substantial amount of resources the military received. 
Yet, even if military spending decreased dramatically, there was little 
incentive for the military elite to abandon the authoritarian bargain in 1985. Examining 
possible scenarios, it is clear that the military would have suffered under any foreseeable 
alternative to the status quo. If the regime collapsed or transitioned to democracy it is 
likely that current members of the military elite would be purged from power either as 
31 In coding the results of the analysis of elite cohesion, if all groups within the authoritarian bargain 
support the regime, then elite cohesion is high. If none of the groups support the regime, then cohesion is 
low. If some groups will likely support the regime, but others will not, then elite cohesion is coded as 
moderate. 
32 All data on Syrian military expenditures in this chapter is from World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, various years). While high, these figures 
most likely underestimate Syrian military expenditures. The data cited does not include spending on major 
weapons programs that in 1985 were still supplied by the Soviet Union on highly concessional terms. 
Syrian military expenditures reflect primarily domestic spending on public works, construction, and light 
manufacturing-spending used primarily to maintain support in patrimonial relationships. See Richards 
and Waterbury, p. 341 for a discussion of Syrian military spending. 
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reprisal for past support of the Asad regime or as an accounting for "crimes" committed 
in the name of social control. If the military itself attempted to seize the state, it would 
have most likely faced mobilized opposition from the party structure-a structure that 
had deep roots in Syrian society in 1985. In essence, the party provided an effective 
deterrent to praetorian military action. 
The degree to which the Asad regime could rely upon the support of the 
military was shown, anecdotally, in the early 1980s. "It is a measure of the regime's 
control over the armed forces and its substantial professional and political discipline that 
it could be used in an overtly sectarian conflict in Lebanon and that despite the 
unprecedented massive use of military force against Hama in 1982, the army, overall, 
remained loyal. ,,33 
The Asad regime and the military elite had a strong, mutually dependent 
relationship in 1985. The military was an important pillar of the regime, and received 
significant amounts of resources. Ideologically, the regime justified the large role of the 
military in Syrian society with Ba'thist doctrine. The institutionalized structure of the 
Ba'th party deterred the military from becoming overly ambitious. In short, in 1985 the 
continued importance of the military elite was tied inextricably to the continued rule of 
the Asad regime. 
33 Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation, p. 164. 
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b. The Ba'th Party and the Asad Regime 
As demonstrated earlier, in 1985 the Ba'th party provided an effective link 
between the Asad regime and Syrian society. An examination of the social bases of the 
party reveals that the interests of the party and the interests of the regime overlapped 
substantially, explaining the strong relationship between party and regime shown in 
Figure 1, P 31. 
The Ba'th party in 1985 drew its strength from-and thus represented the 
interests of-primarily lower-class rural segments of Syrian society. The party "clearly 
[retained] a distinctively plebian character, with the lower classes making up 60% to 70% 
of the membership and the upper strata only about 1_2%.,,34 After further studying party 
composition, Hinnebusch noted that ''the urban-rural distinction is hard to measure from 
the data, but Damascus city, in spite of the concentration of political elite and the apex of 
party apparatus there is still somewhat underrepresented, while mountainous provinces ... 
and plains provinces with a history of peasant politicization ... are over represented; 
... This suggests the party remains strongest in the historic peasant strongholds from 
which "it originally emerged.,,35 
The political interests of these lower-class rural segments of Syrian society 
were well represented in the Ba'thist ideology espoused by the Asad regime in 1985. 
These groups favored governmental action to redistribute wealth and feared being 
exploited by both the large landowners and urban businessmen. The party constituency 
supported the socialist, state-led development strategy followed by the Asad regime. 36 
Importantly, the policies of the regime created institutional barriers that limited the 
importance of the private sector in the Syrian economy. The state-led development 
34 Ibid., p. 181. 
35 Ibid., p. 185. " 
36 This fact is borne out by surveys taken by Hinnebusch in 1974 of party recruits. According to the data, 
95 percent of Bath party recruits favored governmental action to control the distribution of wealth. Ibid. 
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scheme favored by the Asad regime favored the primary constituency of the Ba'th party, 
limiting the incentive ofthe party to abandon the regime. 
c. The Public Economic Sector and the Asad Regime 
The interests of the public economic sector and the Asad regime 
overlapped extensively in 1985. The public sector benefited under the Asad regime. It 
provided the Asad regime with the support of urban workers and the governmental 
bureaucracy. As shown in Table 2, during the first ten years of the Asad regime the size 
of the public sector grew rapidly. This trend partially reflected the ideologically driven 
social agenda of the Ba'thist Asad regime. More importantly, the public sector grew as it 
became apparent to the Asad regime that the public sector could form an effective 
patronage network for the masses-a network relatively free of party and military 
overtones in which average Syrians would feel comfortable participating. An added 
benefit was that growth in the public sector undermined the private sector elite. 
In short, "[t]il1 the mid-1980s, the public payroll was one of the most 
important instruments for members of the regime elite to extend favours and make or 
placate clients. ,,37 It is unlikely that the public economic sector would withdraw support 
from the Asad regime because the policies of the regime provided both extensive 
resources and ideologically justified the important role of the public economic sector in 
Syrian society. 
Elite cohesion was high in Syria in 1985. The groups within the 
authoritarian bargain-the military elite, the public economic sector, and the Ba'th 
partY-had common interests that were well-served by the continued rule of the Asad 
regime. These groups would have suffered under almost any foreseeable alternative. 
37 Perthes, Political Economy o/Syria, pp. 141-142. 
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Importantly, the institutionalized role of the party limited the praetorian 
potential of the military, and provided ideological justification for the respective roles of 
the groups within the authoritarian bargain. "Inter-elite· relations were not exclusively 
zero-sum ones-Alawis against Sunnis, military against civilian; indeed state structures 
fostered a certain cooperation serving common elite interests. In short, the level of 
cohesion attained by the elite, in spite of its sectarian heterogeneity, resulted not 
exclusively from primordial ties, but also from a certain shared ideology, even some 
accepted rules of the game embodied in the ~egal-rational ~tructures of the state.,,38 .The 
Asad regime in 1985 was not a narrow sectarian regime. Rather, it was an authoritarian 
regime with a relatively broad base of support. The institutional structures and 
relationships within the state created a cohesive elite structure composed of mutually 
dependent groups that favored the continued rule of the Asad regime. 
Civilian Employees 
Military and Security 
Total 
Table 2 
Employment in the Syrian Public Economic Sector 









Source: Employment data from Perthes, The Syrian Economy Under Asad, p. 141. 
Population data from World Bank Tables, 1993. Percentages calculated by author. 
3. Availability of External Rent-1985 
In the political economy model, available external rent can make an authoritarian 
bargain more durable. By providing an authoritarian regime with crucial resources, 
external rent can mitigate the effect of the economic crisis on the regime. The Syrian 
38 Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation, p. 311. 
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economic crisis of 1985-1991 was sparked by a loss offoreign aid that triggered a foreign 
exchange crisis. This fact alone does not mean that external rent was unavailable to the 
Asad regime--foreign aid is only one component of external rent. In fact, the data 
presented below demonstrates that external rent-foreign aid and oil revenue--was 
available to the Asad regime throughout the crisis, implying that the authoritarian bargain 
should have been quite durable from 1985 to 1991. 
Figure 2 shows the level of foreign aid and oil revenue from 1980 to 1991. It is 
apparent that the Asad regime found creative ways to collect external rent during the 
economic crisis-primarily by developing the Syrian oil industry. In 1984, Syria 
produced approximately 170,000 barrels of oil per day (bid). Production reached 
600,000 bid after the crisis and Syria could export approximately 350,000 bid-bringing 
in $1.6 to $2.0 billion per year.39 
Not shown in Figure 2 is the windfall foreign aid that the Asad regime garnered 
by supporting the US led coalition against Iraq in 1990. This single foreign policy 
decision netted the Asad regime at least $2 billion in foreign aid.4o Syria parlayed 
participation in the coalition ipto a crucial external rent. 
Increased production in the oil industry and timely participation in the coalition 
against Iraq meant that external rent was available to the Asad regime during the 
economic crisis--even though the crisis itself was sparked by the loss of foreign aid from 
the Soviet Union and Persian Gulf states. 
39 Oil production data from Syrian Country Report 1993, U.S. Department of Energy-Energy Information 
Administration. Accessed via the internet. Dollar value of production from Hisham Melham, "Syria 
Between Two Transitions," Middle East Research and Iriformation Project, No. 203, Vol. 27 (Spring 
1997), p. 3. 
40 Raymond Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria," International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No.3 (August 1995), p. 315. This windfall aid is not included in 
Figure 2, as the aid-and improving GDP-signaled the end of the crisis. Even when the $2 billion of aid 
is not included, it is apparent that external rent was available to the Asad regime throughout the crisis. 
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Figure 2. Components of Syrian External Rent (1980-1991)41 
C. THE OBSERVED POLITICAL OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS 
The political economy model predicts that, given the circumstances outlined 
above, the Asad regime would most likely be able to survive an economic crisis in 1985 
with little accompanying political liberalization. The dominant party structure of the 
regime combined with a high degree of elite cohesion would channel dissent and help 
prevent the collapse of the authoritarian bargain. External rent would allow the Asad 
regime to directly co-opt the most important social groups-lessening the effect of the 
economic crisis. A review of events within Syria after the crisis demonstrates that the 
Asad regime did indeed survive the economic crisis without being forced into any 
substantial political hberalization. 
41 Values for oil revenue are from Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 30. No data is given for 1991, so 
the value shown in Figure 2 for 1991 is the average of values given by Perthes for 1990 and 1992. 
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Seven years after the end of the crisis, the Asad regime remains frrmly entrenched 
in power. There have been events-namely the 1990 restructuring of the parliament, the 
release of thousands of political prisoners in 1991, and the increased role of the private 
economic sector in the making of economic policy-that could be interpreted as forms of 
political liberalization. However, when viewed from a broader perspective, it becomes 
apparent that these were simply "efforts to mollify public discontent with a token 
relaxation of political control.'.42 To date, the Asad regime has not institutionalized any 
effective limits on the power of the executive branch of government. The expanded 
Parliament cannot influence the budget and ''the duties, or rights, of the Parliament 
remain limited.,,43 Volker Perthes concludes that although the regime granted "a higher 
degree of autonomy to the private sector and thereby surrender[ ed] some economic 
levers, the regime has not relinquished any ofits political powers.'M 
As hinted at in the above discussion of the political outcome of the economic 
crisis, change did occur in the Syrian political system, it was just not institutionalized 
political liberalization. Although able to avoid significant political liberalization, the 
Asad regime fundamentally altered the natme of state-society relations within Syria to 
remain in power. The political outcome was, in the Przeworski typology, broadened 
dictatorship. Specifically, the regime abandoned the Ba'th party that helped make the 
party an effective link between the state and society. Out of necessity, the regime began 
to rely more heavily upon the military and private economic sector. 
The next chapter analyzes the effect of these changes on the stability of the Asad 
regime by examining an economic crisis occurring in the year 2010. The chapter 
demonstrates that to achieve short-term stability during the economic crisis of 1985-1991, 
42 Volker Perthes, "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalization," in Contemporary Syria: 
Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace ed. Eberhard Kienle (London: British Academic Press, 
1994), p. 65. 
43 Ibid., p. 67. 
44 Ibid., p. 70. 
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the Asad regime enacted irrevocable reforms that leave the regime poorly situated to 
survive a future economic crisis, creating the possibility of regime instability and even 
democratization. 
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IV. CASE 2: ECONOMIC CRISIS 2010 
The Syrian economic crisis of 1985-1991 examined in Chapter III demonstrates 
that the political economy model can predict and explain political outcomes of economic 
crises in authoritarian regimes. The approach provides insight into complex processes by 
identifying the key factors that reflect the durability of the authoritarian bargain. This 
chapter analyzes the long-term prospects for regime stability and democratization in 
Syria by examining a notional economic crisis occurring in 2010 through the framework 
of the political economy model. 
As outlined in Chapter II, the political economy model predicts political outcomes 
of economic crises in authoritarian regimes using a two-step process. First, the model 
examines the likelihood that an authoritarian regime will survive an economic crisis 
intact. Then, if the regime seems unlikely to survive, the model predicts a specific 
political outcome using the strategic interaction model. The organization of this chapter 
mirrors this process in that it consists of two major sections. 
The first section predicts the prospects for survival of the Asad regime during the 
2010 crisis: examining the durability of the authoritarian bargain as it most likely will 
exist in 2010. As in Chapter III, the durability of the bargain is reflected in the values of 
three indicators: regime type, elite cohesion, and the availability of external rent. The 
evidence demonstrates that the Asad regime will most likely not survive a severe, non-
self-correcting economic crisis in 2010 due to changes within the Syrian authoritarian 
bargain-changes that stem from the economic reforms undertaken in response to the 
1985-1991 economic crisis. 
The second section of this chapter predicts a specific political outcome of the 
crisis using the precepts of the strategic interaction model: that elite preferences and 
choices, combined with the resources available to the various elite groups, eventually 
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determine the outcome. This section reaches a more tentative conclusion that the most 
likely political outcome of the 2010 crisis is transition to democracy. 
A. PROSPECTS FOR REGIME SURVIVAL IN 2010 
An economic crisis, equal in severity to the one that gripped Syria from 1985-
1991, is likely to strike Syria within the next twenty years. The economic reforms 
implemented by the Asad regime during and after the 1985-1991 crisis were 
incomplete-they failed to install effective price mechanisms and free markets that 
would, theoretically, make the economy less vulnerable to external shocks and crises. 
This theoretical prediction of an economic crisis is supported by two general trends 
occurring within Syria that both portend difficult economic tim~s-the maturation of the 
Syrian oil industry and rapid population growth.1 
The ability of an authoritarian regime to survive an economic crisis by 
implementing needed economic reforms without collapsing or undertaking significant 
political liberalization depends upon the durability of the authoritarian bargain. The 
strength of the bargain is reflected in three indicators: regime type, elite cohesion, and the 
availability of external rent. In 2010, the Asad regime will be a military regime with, at 
best, moderate levels of elite cohesion. Significant amounts of external rent will not be 
available to the regime during the economic crisis. The implications of these assertions 
are clear-the political economy model predicts that, given these initial conditions, the 
Asad regime will not survive an economic crisis in 2010 intact. 
1 See Douglas Jebl, "In Syria, Only the Population is Growing," New York Times, 28 January 1998, for a 
prediction of the coming Syrian economic crisis. See Richards and Waterbury, pp. 89-102 for a general 
analysis of Middle Eastern population growth and the burden that it places on regional economies. Perthes, 
for example, estimates that 250,000 to 300,000 jobs must be generated per year in the first decade of the 
next century to maintain a constant unemployment rate. He concludes, "it is hard to see how enough jobs 
can be found." (perthes, Political Economy o/Syria, p. 63) 
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1. Regime Type-2010 
Regime type is an important indicator of the durability of the authoritarian bargain 
because dominant party regimes have effective institutions to channel dissent and 
dampen intra-elite cleavages. Military regimes, lacking such institutions, are thus more 
vulnerable to elite cleavages during economic crises. In 1985, the Asad regime was a 
dominant party regime. The Ba'th party provided a functioning link between the state 
and society while the military and party were functionally separate. In 1998, the role of 
the Ba'th party in Syrian society has changed-the party and its socialist, pan-Arab 
ideology is no longer an important source of power for the regime. The party has become 
an ineffective link between the regime and relevant social groups within Syrian society. 
For the purposes of the political economy model, by 2010 the Asad regime will be 
functionally equivalent to a military regime.2 
To justify this classification of the Asad regime of2010 as a military regime, it is 
necessary to document the diminished stature of the party within Syrian society in 1998.3 
Both during and after the 1985-1991 economic crisis, the Asad regime retreated from two 
of the ideological pillars of the Ba'th party-socialism and pan-Arabism. This retreat left 
2 The Asad regime will be ''functionally equivalent" to a military regime and not a ''true'' military regime as 
defined by the model because in 2010 it is unlikely that the military will constitute ''the most important 
institutional framework for the recruitment of political leaders and the deliberation of policy issues." 
(Haggard and Kaufinan, pp. 11-12.) Instead, it appears that elite recruitment is shifting from the party to 
the private sector and that deliberation of non-security issues is also taking more input from the private 
sector. On these points see Joseph Bahout, "The Syrian Business Community, its Politics and Prospects," 
in Contemporary Syria, p. 77. It seems likely that the institutional structure of the party will remain intact 
in the future, but that the party will become unable to effectively dampen elite cleavages and channel 
dissent as it once did-for reasons fully explained in the elite cohesion section of this chapter. 
3 One objection to this line of reasoning is that just because the importance and effectiveness of the Ba'th 
party has dwindled in 1998, there is no guarantee that the party will not regain its previous stature within 
Syrian society by 2010. While such a reversal is plausible, it is not likely. "Indicative of the seeming 
permanence of the ideological change [within the Asad regime] is the fact that the revival of the economy 
in the 1990s has not brought a resmgence of socialist rhetoric." (Hinnebusch, ''Economic Liberalization in 
Syria," p. 315) This criticism regarding the permanence of the perceived changes in Syrian society can be 
made of the predictions regarding regime type and elite cohesion. The fact remains that as of 1998 the 
Asad regime has made no effort to restore state-society relations to their pre-1985 status. 
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the party unable to effectively channel dissent over economic and political reform issues 
during future crises. 
The dwindling effectiveness of the party is seen in actions taken by the regime to 
distance itself from the socialist ideology of the party. While officially maintaining a 
commitment to socialism, Asad himself admitted in a series of speeches given in the 
early 1990s that economic and even political change were necessary within Syria to 
restore economic growth. To a careful listener, these speeches came close to an 
admission that somewhere during the past twenty years, socialism had led the country 
astray.4 Additionally, economic reform has hurt the party and its constituents harder than 
any other group within Syrian society. Perthes notes that the Ba'th represents ''forces on 
the losing end of the economic restructuring process.,,5 Particularly damaging to the 
Ba'th party was a 1986 law that created mixed-sector agricultural companies and 
reversed previous laws regarding land tenure. ''Instead of limiting private property in 
agricultural land, the concentration of vast landed holdings in a few hands was again 
permitted and even encouraged.,,6 This policy is not socialist in nature, and it is 
especially unpalatable to the party because it reverses earlier Ba'thist efforts to undercut 
the traditional landed elite. 
The disparity between the policies of the Asad regime and the ideology of the 
party is also seen in Syrian foreign polley. After the 1985-1991 economic crisis, the 
regime shattered any claim it could make to pursuing a pan-Arab policy toward Israel-a 
position favored by the Ba'th party and its constituency-by attending the 1991 Madrid 
4 Perthes, "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalization," p. 65. Of course, Asad insisted that he was 
not abandoning socialism and embracing capitalism and political liberalism. Instead, he pointed out that 
"Syria would not copy, and had never copied in the past, the examples of other countries." (Ibid.) These 
mollifying words were no doubt intended to ease the worries of social groups that had traditionally 
supported the regime for its socialist practices. 
5 Ibid., p. 66. 
6 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 55. 
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Peace Conference.7 Certainly, the foreign policy of the Asad regime toward Israel had 
been pragmatic before deciding to attend the conference, but unlike the decision to attend 
the conference, these temporary, often unwritten agreements did not mark strategic 
changes in the Syrian position toward Israel. The decision to attend the conference 
modified the traditional Syrian stance by agreeing to talks before Israeli withdrawal, 
agreeing to direct bilateral talks with Israel, and even discussing the issue of a formal 
peace with Israel. 8 
The socialist, pan-Arab ideology of the party. abandoned, the Asad regime also 
reduced the visible role of the party within Syrian society. Most importantly, since 1985 
there has been no convening of the regional Ba'th party congresses. ''For the party, these 
congresses are of considerable importance. They put stamp on a period; they may focus 
on a particularly pressing problem; they lay down policy guidelines for the years ahead.,,9 
By simply not staging these events, the regime undercut the popular image of the party 
and its practical effectiveness. 
The dwindling importance of the Ba'th party within Syria in 1998 can also be 
seen in the changing use of symbols and rhetoric. To underscore the declining symbolic 
importance of the party, ''posters and banners and other outward signs of the party's 
presence have been reduced" after the economic crisis. 10 Another telling example of the 
changing symbolic role of the party within Syria is found in an event that took place 
during the 1991 presidential elections. "While the RC [Regional Command] and many 
government ministers waited for the President in a niilitary school-turned-polling-station 
to cast his vote in their midst, Asad showed up in the bourgeois Malki district of 
7 Surveys taken by Hinnebusch indicate that party recruits favored a hard-line stance toward Israel-
"[recruit] attitudes appear to support a more militant policy than Syria's government has actually pursued." 
(Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation, p. 185.) This statement was written before the 
Asad regime decided to soften its stance toward Israel by attending the Madrid Conference. 
S Daniel Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.4 (Fall 1991), pp. 45-46. 
9 Seale, "Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy," p~ 100. 
10 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 161. 
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Damascus, close by his office, accompanied not by party or government officials but by 
Badr aI-Din Shalleh, the veteran president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce. The 
symbolism of the act was not lost on the Syrians."Il 
In summary, by 2010, the Asad regime is expected to be a military regime in that 
there will likely not be an effective party mechanism to link the Asad regime to Syrian 
society. The divergence between the actions of the Asad regime and the ideology and 
interests of the primary constituents of the Ba'th party limits the capacity of the party to 
mobilize support from relevant societal actors. The party, with its socialist pan-Arab 
ideology, no longer provides the overarching blueprint for the organization of Syrian 
society, as it did in 1985. Lacking an institutionalized ideology and party to constrain 
potentially rival elite groups, in 2010 the Asad regime will most likely be a military 
regime. 
2. Elite Cohesion-2010 
As outlined in Chapter II, elite cohesion is an important indicator of the durability 
of an authoritarian bargain because intra-elite cleavages undermine the stability of 
authoritarian regimes. Elite cohesion is defined as the degree to which groups within the 
authoritarian bargain possess common interests and the degree to which these interests 
would be served by the continued rule of the existing regime. For example, in 1985 the 
Syrian authoritarian bargain consisted of the Asad regime, the military elite, the public 
economic sector, and the Ba'th party. Elite cohesion was high because these groups had 
substantial interests that were better served by the continued existence of the regime than 
by any other likely alternative--even during an economic crisis that called into question 
the ability of the regime to meet its end of the authoritarian bargain. This example of 
elite cohesion can be directly contrasted with the Syrian situation in 2010, when elite 
11 Ibid. 
46 
cohesion will be moderate at best, as groups within the authoritarian bargain no longer 
have interests well-served by the continued existence of the regime. 
This pessimistic assessment of Syrian elite cohesion in 2010 is grounded in a 
critical analysis of the expected authoritarian bargain in 2010 and the anticipated interests 
of each group within the bargain relative to the interests of the regime. The following 
sub-sections outline the expected Syrian authoritarian bargain and examine the interests 
of each group within the bargain relative to the interests of the regime with the goal of 
predicting Syrian elite cohesion in 2010. 
a. The New Syrian Authoritarian Bargain 
The Syrian authoritarian bargain is expected to be quite different in 2010 
than it was in 1985. The anticipated Syrian authoritarian bargain is shown in Figure 3. 
There are three important changes in the bargain that must be noted: (1) the private 
economic sector is now incorporated into the bargain, and it has a strong relationship 
with the regime; (2) the relationship between the Ba'th party and the regime has 
weakened to the point that it has fallen out of the bargain entirely; and (3) the relationship 
between the public economic sector and the regime has weakened, and that group has 
also fallen out of the bargain. The changing role of the Ba'th party in Syrian society has 
already been outlined, and the role of the military has not changed substantially from 
1985. Thus, the new authoritarian bargain can be explained by examining the changing 
roles of the private and public economic sectors within Syrian society, roles that can only 
be understood by examining the economic reforms undertaken in 1985: a reform effort 
cOnUnonly referred to as the second Syrian infitah. 12 
12 Infitah-literally meaning ··opening"-is a term widely used to describe economic liberalization 
throughout the Middle East, and in Egypt particularly. Richards and Waterbury define the term as "a shift 
in state economic policy toward greater reliance on market forces, increased emphasis on the private sector, 
improved public-sector decision making, and wider opening to international markets." (Richards and 
Waterbury, p. 222) The economic liberalization efforts after 1985 are the second infitah because the Asad 
regime undertook a more limited reform effort in the early 19705. See Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 164-171 for 
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Figure 3. The Anticipated Syrian Authoritarian Bargain in 2010 
The second Syrian infitah beg~ like most economic reform efforts, as an 
attempt to generate growth and investment. The 1985-1991 crisis demonstrated to the 
Asad regime that the Syrian development scheme and socialist economic philosophy 
were flawed. But before the specifics of the infitah can be explored, an important point 
must be made. The second infitah was not a comprehensive, coherent neoliberal 
economic reform package, although it was similar in content to typical reforms dictated 
by the International Monetary Fund. Rather, the second infitah was a collection of 
reforms taken almost haphazardly in response to pressing problems. Hinnebusch 
classifies the reform effort as one of "selective liberalization.,,13 The goal of the infitah 
''was not simply to stabilize the economy but...to stabilize the regime.,,14 Thus, the Asad 
regime often simultaneously pursued contradictory policies, making analysis of the 
reform effort problematic. Rather than recounting every twist and turn of Syrian 
economic policy, the analysis below focuses on the effects of the reform by examining 
a discussion of these early reform efforts. For an explanation of the differences between the first and 
second Syrian infitah see Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 53. 
13 Hinnebusch, "Economic Liberalization In Syria," p. 315. 
14 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 67. 
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how the Asad regime attempted to achieve one short term goal-the generation of foreign 
exchange, and one long term goal-the generation of investment and growth in the 
private economic sector. 
The economic crisis ofl985 began when the loss of foreign aid triggered a 
foreign exchange crisis. It follows logically that the earliest reform efforts taken by the 
regime were designed to "enable the private sector to generate its own foreign exchange 
and, at the same time, to increase the foreign exchange reserves of the state.,,15 A series 
of laws gradually chipped away at state control of foreign exchange. Private 
manufacturers and exporters were allowed to keep more of the foreign exchange they 
generated: encouraging private manufacturing and export.16 Eventually, the Central Bank 
of Syria (CBS) gave up its legal monopoly on the foreign exchange market. The CBS 
could now act as a mere middleman in essentially private foreign exchange transactions. 
This change represented "a qualitative step insofar as it allowed for a limited degree of 
private foreign exchange dealings, thus stripping the state of a legal monopoly and an 
instrument of control.,,17 
The importance of these changes in foreign exchange law should not be 
underestimated. In a country pursuing the lSI development approach, the control of 
imports is crucial to the success or failure of the economy. One way of controlling the 
flow of legal imports is to control foreign exchange. 18 By allowing the private 'economic 
sector to generate and keep a large portion of the foreign exchange it earned, the Asad 
regime made an important concession to the private sector: there was no guarantee that 
IS Perthes, "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalization," p. 56. 
16 In 1983, private manufacturers were legally allowed to keep 50 percent of foreign exchange earned via 
exports. By 1987, this privilege was extended to all private exporters and the limit went up to 75 percent. 
Perthes, Political Economy ojSyria, p. 54. 
17 Ibid., p. 56. 
18 The control of foreign exchange is important only to official imports. The black market thrived in Syria 
throughout this period, making any state control of imports one in name only. Yet the change in the 
institutional framework was important because it signaled the economic intentions of the regime to 
potential investors. 
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the foreign exchange would be used in ways favoring the regime. Additionally, the legal 
state monopoly on imports was gradually broken during the crisis as import restrictions 
were lifted. These actions alleviated the short-term foreign exchange crisis in Syria. 
With the most pressing concern taken care ot: the Asad regime set out to 
enact extensive reforms designed to allow the private economic. sector to take 
responsibility for generating economic growth and investment-two tasks at which the 
public economic sector had failed miserably. To accomplish these goals, the second 
infitah transferred control over the use of investment capital from the public sector to the 
private sector.19 
Before 1988, the Asad regime tightly controlled the scope of private 
industrial activity by annually listing those areas in which private industrial investment 
and activity would be allowed. The· inherent problem in such a system is that it stifled 
private investment-"potential investors could never be sure that the establishment of an 
industrial furn ... would still be permitted in the following year.,,20 Laws delineating 
which areas were open to private investment formed an institutional barrier that 
prevented the private sector from fully developing. This was, no doubt, done 
intentionally by the Asad regime to favor the constituencies that formed the authoritarian 
bargain in 1985~specially the public economic sector and the Ba'th Party. 
The secondary role of the private sector within Syrian society began to 
change in 1986. In that year, "mixed" sector agricultural companies were legalized. 
"These companies were private in all but name. The state held a minority share but did 
not interfere with the conduct of business.,,21 The official role of the private sector 
19 In reality, changes in economic law have generally been more extensive than changes in economic 
practice within Syria This is especially true after the crisis ended in 1991 and the Asad regime felt little 
need to reform. See Jehl for a discussion of the frustration Syrian businessmen felt with the regime in 1998 
concerning the slow pace of follow on reform. Yet, the regime has taken no actions to reverse the gains 
made by the private sector within Syrian society, supporting the position that the private sector will be an 
importance source of growth and investment in 2010. 
20 Perthes, Political Economy ojSyria, pp. 57-58. 
21 Ibid., p 52. 
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expanded again in 1988 as the rules concerning private production were revamped. A 
negative list was issued in 1988 that detailed those areas in which private economic 
activity was prohibited. Law number 10 of 1991 went even further. It opened all areas to 
private production: the only stipulations being a minimum investment of $240,000 and 
the approval of a newly created Council for Investments. The law stipulated that formal 
rules now governed the approval process, which itself was limited to 60 days to promote 
efficiency. Economic criteria were to be the benchmark the Council used to weigh the 
relative merits of each proposal.22 The institutional barriers that had constrained the 
private economic sector were officially removed. 
In Syria, as in many authoritarian countries, change in economic law does 
not always result in change in economic practices. Yet, in this instance, the growing role 
of the private economic sector within Syrian society can be found not only in the laws 
passed by the government but also in economic data and events on the ground. The 
increasing importance of the private economic sector is shown in Table 3. In 1989, in the 
midst of the economic crisis, public and private investment was equal. By 1992, the 
latest year for which data is available, private investment outnumbered public investment 
by almost a two-to-one margin. Additionally, "accumulated liberalizing initiatives since 
the mid-1980s have stimulated the private sector. Private-sector exports as well as 
imports greatly expanded. The number of private businesses grew from 220,000 in 1981 
to about 370,000 in 1988 and industries employing more than 10 workers doubled from 
890 to almost 1,800.,,23 
The increasingly important role played by the private sector is also seen, at 
least anecdotally, in the manner in which the regime handled the debate regarding the 
creation of a stock market. While the proposal for a stock market has not yet been 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hinnebusch, ''Economic Liberalization in Syria," p. 317. 
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implemented, the method in which the regime handled the debate indicates that the 
regime is taking care to include the private economic sector where it is feasible to do so. 
Members of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce participated in the policy debate, 
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Source: Hinnebusch, ''Economic Liberalization in Syria," pp. 315-317. Percentages 
calculated by author. 
In summary, on an economic level the second Syrian infitah weakened the 
control of the Asad regime over foreign exchange and imports, and allowed the private 
economic sector greater leeway in selecting areas for future development and investment. 
These economic changes had important political results: actions taken by the Asad 
regime in response to the 1985-1991 crisis favored the private economic sector and ran 
counter to the interests of the public economic sector and the Ba'th party. Hinnebusch 
notes that "creating an investment climate suitable for a capitalist alternative to statism 
required the revocation of populist rights on which support of the regime by its 
constituency rested. ,,25 Additionally, the growing size and importance of the private 
24 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 216. 
25 Hinnebusch, ''Economic Liberalization in Syria," p. 307. 
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sector made the public sector politically expendable, as the public sector was no longer 
the only avenue available to the Asad regime to politically incorporate urban elements of 
Syrian society. These changes in the authoritarian bargain are reflected in Figure 3, p. 
48. The anticipated Syrian authoritarian bargain, a product of the second Syrian infitah, 
has important consequences for Syrian elite cohesion in 2010: consequences that can now 
be fully examined. 
b. The Military Elite and the Asad Regime 
In 2010, the Asad regime and the Syrian military elite will most likely 
have a strong, mutually dependant relationship very similar to the relationship that 
existed in 1985. The latest data available indicates that the regime still allocates 15 
percent of GDP for military spending, and this percentage is unlikely to drop in the 
future. Even if the Arab-Israeli conflict were ''resolved'' before 2010, it is likely that 
memories of the conflict would be vivid enough to demand large defense expenditures as 
a hedge against any future conflict with Israel. 
Yet, as seen in the analysis of the relationship between the military and the 
regime in 1985, even if military spending did drop sharply by 2010, the military elite 
would have little incentive to abandon the Asad regime in favor of democracy. If the 
regime transitioned to democracy, it is likely that members of the military elite would be 
purged from power either as reprisal for past support of the Asad regime or as an 
accounting for "crimes" committed in the name of social control. Thus the military has 
an incentive to remain loyal to the regime. The primary goal of the military elite-
maintaining a position of power within the Syrian society-is inextricably linked to the 
continued rule of the Asad regime.26 
26 A subtle difference between the relationship between the military elite and the regime in 1985 and 2010 
is that in 1985 the military elite was constrained by an effective party organization that limited the 
praetorian potential of the military. This institutional constraint is not likely to exist in 2010, creating the 
possibility of a military coup. Since such a coup would replace the Asad regime if successful, such a 
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c. The Private Economic Sector and the Asad Regime 
In 2010, the relationship between the private economic sector and the 
Asad regime will be strong. As seen in Table 3, p. 52, the regime will rely heavily upon 
the private sector to generate growth and investment. Yet, the interests of the regime and 
the private sector will not substantially overlap. The rule of law and independent 
jUdiciary capable of guaranteeing personal property rights and enforcing business 
contracts that are widely recognized to make long-term private sector growth possible are 
inimical to the social control needs of the regime. Imagine, for example, the case of an 
investor who starts a business that competes directly with a business owned by a local 
notable who supports the regime. If this new investor began to take business away from 
the politically important competitor, it is quite conceivable that the regime might step in, 
shut down the business, and confiscate all the new equipment. This confiscation, 
although justifiable for social control reasons, would undoubtedly chill future investment 
by all but the boldest venture capitalists. Similar examples can be postulated for almost 
every economic sector. The essential question then becomes how likely is the private 
sector to push for institutionalized political reform during the coming economic crisis? 
In attempting to predict the behavior of the private sector, one must look at 
capabilities and not actions. In 1998 there is little tangible evidence to suggest that the 
private sector might abandon the Asad regime. It is this lack of evidence, combined with 
a somewhat rosy prediction regarding future economic performance, that leads Perthes to 
note that "the bourgeoisie ... is too weak to push through its economic-policy objectives, 
scenario is examined in the next major section of this chapter that attempts to predict a specific political 
outcome of the 2010 economic crisis. Giving the benefit of the doubt to the regime, this analysis of elite 
cohesion assumes that the military remains loyal to the regime. This makes the ultimate estimate of elite 
cohesion a conservative one. 
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and it is therefore hardly imaginable that it would be able to enforce on the regime a 
schedule for democratic change. ,,27 
Yet, this lack of evidence is also congruent with a private economic sector 
biding its time until the right opportunity presents itself. The expanding role of the 
private sector has not, at least in 1998, been institutionalized within Syrian society. 
During times of economic plenty, the Asad regime is probably secure enough to reverse 
the advances made by the private sector through coercion. As far as capabilities are 
concerned, in 2010 the private economic sector will hold a powerful weapon with which 
to make demands of the Asad regime: the threat of withdrawing investment capital from 
the Syrian economy. Etel Solingen notes that the "ability of big business (locally and 
foreign owned) to influence domestic investment patterns and to move capital abroad 
often gives them an important voice in shaping domestic and external adjustment 
policy. ,,28 Additionally, the slow pace of economic reforms after 1991, for instance the 
failure of the regime to undertake meaningful banking reform and implement a planned 
stock market, has demonstrated unequivocally to the private sector that the concessions 
made by the regime during the infitah were tactical in nature, designed only to shore up 
the Asad regime at a critical point in its history. 
An economic crisis in 2010 would provide the private sector with an 
opportunity to demand significant institutionalized political change from the regime. 
Indeed, Bahout points out that in the early 1990s, "Syrian entrepreneurs increasingly tend 
to see their cooperation with the state as merely tactical. They are consolidating their 
position within the private sector, aiming first at becoming equal partners, before 
stepping over the limits designed for them, in order to become an autonomous economic, 
social and even political force.,,29 Ironically, the regime voluntarily ceded the weapon to 
27 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 260. 
28 Etel Solingen, "Democracy, Economic Reform, and Regional Cooperation," Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, Vol. 8, No.1 (January 1996), p. 87. 
29 Bahout, p. 77. 
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the private sector that will allow the private sector to challenge the regime during the 
2010 crisis: the control of investment capital. 
d. Conclusions Regarding Elite Cohesion 
In examining the new Syrian authoritarian bargain and the interests of 
each member of the bargain, it becomes apparent that elite cohesion will be moderate, at 
best, in 2010. The military will likely be the most ardent supporter of the regime, but the 
private economic sector may find adequate reasons to support an alternative political 
organization, and they will have the power to do so. The decisions made by the Asad 
regime in the name of "selective liberalization" have created intra-elite tensions that will 
make Syrian elite cohesion moderate in 2010. 
3. Availability of External Rent-2010 
External rent is an important indicator of the durability of the authoritarian 
bargain because it can mitigate the effect of an economic crisis on the regime. Yet, it is 
also the most difficuh of the three factors to accurately predict before a crisis begins. 
Unlike elite cohesion and regime type, the availability of external rent can change almost 
instantaneously, as seen during the 1990 Gulf War when the Asad regime received at 
least $2 billion in aid as the result ofa single foreign policy decision.30 However, a 
reasonable prediction regarding external rent can still be made by examining the 
prospects for future rent in two areas: the Syrian oil industry and foreign aid. 
The prospects for growth in the Syrian oil industry are dim. Syria simply does not 
have enough high quality oil fields to increase production fast enough to match growing 
internal consumption, which is driven upward by population growth and economic 
30 For an example of scholarship that failed to anticipate the ability of the Asad regime to gather external 
rent and survive during economic crises, see Patrick Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military 




development. ''Unless discoveries are made, the oil production rate is expected to decline 
so quickly that by the middle of the next decade [2005] it could provide only for domestic 
consumption which already exceeds 200,000 barrels a day. That would leave Syria 
without any of the oil revenue on which it now relies so heavily.,,31 The U.S. Department 
of Energy came to a similar conclusion in 1997. "Oil output appears to have reached a 
plateau, however, as older fields ... reach maturity. Production is expected to decline 
steadily over the next several years.,,32 The prospects for new exploration are equally 
bleak-a fact attested to by regime concentration on searching for new natural gas 
reserves, not new oil reserves.33 By 2010, oil and petroleum products are not likely to 
provide substantial amounts of external rent to the Asad regime. 
The trend in oil revenues is relatively simple to forecast when compared to 
forecasting the prospects for foreign aid. Indeed, at any given time, any country with 
available resources may decide to support the Asad regime. Yet, in general, the winding 
down of the Arab-Israeli conflict makes the prospects for future foreign aid to Syria 
bleak. 34 As peace slowly comes to the region, aid to Syria will have to be justified on 
economic, not ideological, grounds. This makes aid less likely because, at least 
historically, the major donors to Syria are from the Arabian Gulf region: in the next 
century they will be struggling with their own economic problems. 35 
31 Jehl, ''In Syria: Only the Population is Growing." 
32 U.S. Department of Energy, Syrian Country Report 1997, p. 2.· 
33 "Syria: MEED Special Report on Oil and Gas," Middle East Economic Digest, 13 January 1997. The 
article goes on to explain that the prospects for finding significant natural gas reserves are also remote in 
that "no new companies have come in to carry out exploration work, and the government's contract terms 
remain as uninviting as ever." 
34 The counter argument is that as a precondition to peace, the Asad regime might extract foreign aid from 
both great powers and regional actors, as was the case when Egypt made peace with Israel. (Bahout, p. 78) 
Yet, this scenario seems unlikely in that Egypt was the first, and thus most important, Arab nation to make 
peace with Israel. As more Arab nations come to terms with Israel, the likelihood of donors providing 
external incentives to anyone nation decline. 
3S Gary Sick, "The Coming Crisis in the Persian Gult:" in The Persian Gulf at the Millenium: Essays in 
Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion eds. Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1997). 
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As oil revenues dwindle and regional peace undercuts the ideological basis for 
foreign aid, overall external rent available to the Asad regime will likely be significantly 
lower than during the 1985-1991 economic crisis. This evidence suggests that the 
amount of rent available will decline in real terms. One final trend supporting the 
assertion that external rents will definitely decline in relative terms is the high Syrian 
population growth rate: 3.4 percent in 1997.36 This high growth rate means that ever 
increasing amounts of aid will be required just to maintain the same degree of social 
control. Perthes, even though relatively optimistic concerning the prospects for external 
rent, concedes that "external rents-both political rents and oil revenues-will most 
probably, under favorable conditions, remain stagnant; i.e., they will decline relative to 
the size of the population and to other economic indicators. ,,37 
4. Conclusions Regarding Regime Survival in 2010 
The Asad regime in 2010 will likely be a military regime with, at best, moderate 
levels of elite cohesion and little available external rent. The political economy model 
suggests that given these conditions, the Asad regime is unlikely to survive a severe, non-
self-correcting economic crisis. The survival of the regime will depend upon a fragile 
authoritarian bargain during difficult economic times-times that will make members of 
the authoritarian bargain question their commitment to the regime. The crisis will 
demand economic reform: reform that is political as much as econoinic in that it creates 
new winners and losers. Now, the political economy model draws from the strategic 
interaction model for insight into the intra-elite dynamic that will determine the ultimate 
political outcome of the crisis. 
36 Melhem, "Syria Between Two Transitions," p. 3. 
37 Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 267. 
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B. THE POLITICAL OUTCOME OF THE 2010 CRISIS 
In attempting to predict the specific political outcome of the 2010 economic 
crisis, the theoretical approach employed by przeworski seems to offer the best hope for 
success. It is the most rigorous variant of the strategic interaction model in that it 
examines the preferences and resources of relevant political actors to predict the political 
outcome.38 As seen in Chapter n, the possible outcomes include status quo dictatorship, 
narrowed dictatorship, broadened dictatorship, insurrection, and transition to democracy. 
The following section outlines his explanation of the har,d-linerlsoft-liner dynamic, and 
provides real-world examples of this dynamic at work in transitions around the world. 
The subsequent section uses the outlined dynamic to explore the likely path of the Syrian 
reforms in 2010. 
1. Elite Interactions during Transitional Periods 
For Przeworski, and others writing in the strategic interaction vein, the beginning 
of a liberalization effort occurs when a split develops in both the ruling elite and society 
concerning the proper course for the country to pursue during a political or economic 
crisis. This split breaks the elite structure into two broad groups: hard-liners and soft-
liners.39 Segments of society align with these groups in varying degrees, based upon their 
respective interests. The specific political outcome of the liberalization project depends 
upon the interaction of these groups. 
If the regime has a durable authoritarian bargain, as seen in the three indicators, . 
then it is likely that the regime will be able to resist this very cleavage, and the likely 
political outcome is status quo dictatorship. This can only occur when economic reforms 
are not necessary. If the regime must implement reform, but has a durable bargain, then 
38 Przeworski, pp. 54-66. 
39 Ibid., p. 56. Przeworski gives examples of this phenomenon in Hungary, East Germany, and Brazil. 
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it is likely that the soft-liners within the elite structure will be able to expand the 
authoritarian bargain to include segments of society not previously incorporated into the 
barga~ usually the private economic sector. The outcome in this instance is broadened 
dictatorship. This is what occurred in Syria after the 1985 economic crisis. Soft-liners 
within the Asad regime attracted the private economic sector into the bargain, ending the 
economic crisis. The same dynamic is seen in the cases of Taiwan and Mexico. 
Confronted with political problems, "political elites in Taiwan and Mexico were able to 
broaden the base if their regimes without losing control over the political system.,,40 
If, however, the regime is unlikely to survive the crisis intact, it is unlikely that 
broadened dictatorship will be the outcome. Although the soft-liners within the state 
structure prefer broadened dictatorship to transition to democracy, the segments of 
society that they are trying to co-opt into the regime will most likely recognize the 
weakened position of the regime and push for further, institutionalized, reform. 41 
This push for further reforms means that hard-liners within the state elite structure 
will be faced with a critical choice between repressing the soft-liners and their supporters 
in a move toward narrowed dictatorship, or allowing the liberalization process to 
continue toward democratization. This choice is made based upon hard-liner perceptions 
regarding the likely effectiveness of repression. Failed repression leads to insurrection, 
the worst of all alternatives for all groups involved, so hard-liners might accept 
democratization as a rational choice: it is a better alternative than civil war. 
Examples of this process abound. The Chinese crackdown in Tiananmen Square 
in 1989 represented a case of repression leading to narrowed dictatorship. The soft-liners 
40 Haggard and Kaufinan, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, p. 267. . 
41 Przeworski contends that in most instances, state soft-liners prefer the following political outcomes 
(listed in descending order of preference): broadened dictatorship, status quo dictatorship, narrowed 
dictatorship, transition to democracy, and insurrection. With transition so low on the list, one might 
wonder how democracy could ever be an outcome. Przeworski presents a convincing case in support of the 
idea that soft-liners within the state elite must change their goals during the process to achieve transition 
and that this occurs when the soft-liners realize that they have unleashed social forces beyond their control. 
Przeworski, p. 63. 
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within the Chinese state system were purged after Tiananmen: quite effectively 
narrowing the power base of the ruling regime. Elements of Chinese society that favored 
liberalization weakened the position of the state soft-liners by going too far too fast with 
too few resources. Governmental hard-liners correctly estimated that the political and 
economic costs of repression could be successfully borne by the regime. 
Alternatively, state hard-liners may be faced with a situation in which repression 
is simply not viable. In describing the events in East Germany in 1989, Przeworski 
notes: "As the eighty-two-year-old head of the East German security apparatus, Erich 
Mielke, is alleged to have said to Honecher, 'Erich, we can't beat up hundreds of 
thousands of people '-a statement I [przeworski] interpret as a technical, and not moral, 
admonition.,,42 At some critical point, state hard-liners will decide that the odds of 
successful repression are so low that their interests will be better served by allowing 
liberalization to continue and attempting to negotiate favorable terms of extraction. It is 
at this critical point that transition to democracy becomes the probable political 
outcome.43 
Thus, the final political outcome of the transitional situation theoretically depends 
upon the decisions and preferences of the hard and soft-liners, as constrained politically 
by the durability of the authoritarian bargain. Applying this framework to the Syrian case 
of201O, it is possible to anticipate the political outcome of the coming economic crisis. 
2. Syrian Elite Interaction-2010 
Unable to co-opt important social actors due to· economic crisis, and unable to 
ideologically contain potential intra-elite cleavages, in 2010 the Asad regime and Syrian 
society will likely split into two broad groups as Przeworski predicted: hard-liners and 
42 Ibid., p. 60. 
43 It is important to note that insurrection, the remaining possible outcome, occurs only as a product of elite 
miscalculation when state hard-liners overestimate the prospects of successful repression and are faced with 
an opposition capable of waging a prolonged civil war. 
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soft-liners. This split is not entirely hypothetical. As seen earlier in this chapter, the 
evidence suggests that a burgeoning Syrian business class, capable of pushing for 
economic and political reform, will exist in 2010. Remembering that this group will 
possess a formidable weapon with which to threaten the regime, the withdrawal of 
investment capitaL the crucial question becomes whether or not the hard-liners will 
choose to repress or allow transition to democracy to continue. As seen above, in 
deciding whether or not to repress a liberalization movement, hard-liners must first 
decide whether or not they think repression c;:an succeed: a decision that rests upon the 
perceived distribution of power and resources within the country. 
In 2010, the relative power of, and resources available to, the hard-liner and soft-
liner factions will be approximately equal. The hard-liners will most likely monopolize 
control of the coercive resources, but as seen in the West German case, this monopoly 
can become meaningless in the face of widespread popular unrest. As seen in Table 3, p. 
52, the soft-liner faction, consisting of both state and societal elements, will most likely 
control an important fraction of overall investment capital in 2010. The withdrawal of 
this capital could cripple the Syrian economy, triggering widespread social unrest. It 
seems that hard-liners will be unable to confidently predict successful repression, given 
the anticipated distribution of power and resources. Even if they were initially able to 
crush the soft-liners militarily, the subsequent flight of capital would put the hard-liners 
in an untenable situation: unable to provide economically for the country, a backlash of 
widespread unrest could be expected. Thus, the interests of the hard-liners within the 
state structure would seem to be best served by agreeing to transition to democracy while 
attempting to negotiate favorable terms ofwithdrawal.44 
44 'The important role of exit guarantees, or pacts, is widely acknowledged in the transition literature. See 
specifically, O'Donnell and Schmitter, pp. 37-47. 
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Unfortunately, the evidence regarding potential resources is simply not strong 
enough to allow for a solid prediction regarding the outcome. Elite misperceptions 
regarding the relative strength of the blocs could lead to transition, narrowed dictatorship, 
or even inadvertently to insurrection. Thus, the most likely political outcome of the 
economic crisis is tentatively transition to democracy. 
In summary, this chapter presented evidence that political instability is likely in 
Syria during the coming economic crisis of2010. The political legacy of the 1985-1991 
crisis and reforms is a fragile, unstable authoritarian bargain that incorporates social 
groups whose long-term interests simply do not overlap the interests of the regime. 
Additionally, it seems that the relative parity of resources available to the two competing 
blocs in 2010 could lead to democratization, although the possibility that miscalculation 
by elite groups might lead to narrowed dictatorship or insurrection cannot be ruled out as 




In response to the 1985-1991 economic crisis, the Asad regime implemented 
economic reforms designed to promote growth and investment. These reforms did not 
install effective price mechanisms and free-markets that would, theoretically, make the 
Syrian economy theoretically stable. Additionally, the reforms failed to officially 
dismantle the bloated public sector: widespread privatization has not yet occurred. 
Instead, the crisis ended when growing oil revenue and windfall foreign aid provided the 
regime with crucial revenue. A rapidly growing population and declining oil revenues, 
when combined with the above-mentioned structural economic problems, create a 
scenario in which economic crisis is likely. 
Thus, in 2010 Syria will stand at a crossroads in its history. Mired in a severe, 
non-self-correcting economic crisis, the political legacy of "selective liberalization"-, a 
fragile authoritarian bargain-will haunt the Asad regime. A newly empowered private 
business sector, representing the interests of traditional elite groups purged from power 
by the Ba'th party in 1963, will possess the resources to demand institutionalized political 
reform, and the regime will be unable to ideologically constrain intra-elite cleavages. 
Political instability within Syria seems likely during the coming economic crisis. 
Predicting the specific outcome of the instability is somewhat more problematic, 
as elite perceptions and actions are difficult to predict. With that caveat in mind, 
transition to democracy is the most likely outcome of the crisis. The relative power of, 
and resources available to, competing factions seem indeterminate: a situation in which 
prudent social actors will agree to institutionalized political liberalization not because 
they are committed to democratic ideals, but rather because it is the most palatable of the 
options they can pursue. 
65 
u.s. policymakers should note two implications of the conclusions. First, 
regional stability in an area deemed vital to U.S. national security will remain elusive 
until the root causes of regional economic underperformance are addressed. 
Additionally, the ability of the political economy model to explain the outcome of the 
1985-1991 economic crisis demonstrates that the Middle East can, and should, be treated 
in comparative perspective. Policymakers, and U.S. security concerns, would be well 
served if the familiar technique of viewing regional political outcomes as functions of 
religion or culture were abandoned in favor of more rigorous analytical approaches-
such as the political economy model used here. 
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